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THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF FREE TRADE: REEXAMINING NAFTA-STYLE
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS
James J. Varellas*
INTRODUCTION
In the last days of the 1990s, the collapse of the Seattle
Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization
("WTO") threw into question what appeared to be an
ascendant consensus in favor of a growing web of so-called
"free trade" agreements.1 Approval of sweeping agreements
establishing the WTO2 and North American Free Trade Area3
* Associate, Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP. J.D., 2007, University of
California, Berkeley, School of Law (Boalt Hall). M.A., Global Political
Economy, 2005, University of Sussex. B.A., History and International
Development Studies, 2002, University of Kentucky. The author would like to
thank Professors Angela Harris, Amy Kapczynski, Goodwin Liu, and Anne
Joseph O'Connell for their helpful comments on drafts of this article. The
author would also like to thank Professors Ian Haney Lopez and Susan Roberts
for sharing their respective expertises in constitutional law and international
political economy. Finally, the author would like to thank the participants in
Professor Liu's Fundamental Rights Seminar and Kate Crosby, Erin Darling,
and Bettina Shzu for their helpful comments and suggestions. The views
expressed in this article are solely those of the author and may not reflect the
views of those mentioned above or Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP.
1. See, e.g., THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE:
UNDERSTANDING GLOBALIZATION 8 (Farrar, Straus & Giroux 1999) ("The
driving idea behind globalization is free-market capitalism-the more you let
market forces rule and the more you open your economy to free trade and
competition, the more efficient and flourishing your economy will be."). But see
Ronald W. Cox, Explaining Business Support for Regional Trade Agreements, in
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBAL WEALTH AND
POWER 366, 366-67 (Jeffry A. Frieden & David A. Lake eds., 4th ed. 2000)
(noting that different corporate sectors tend to support different types of free
trade agreements, with some supporting multilateral deals while others prefer
regional trading blocs).
2. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14, 33 I.L.M. 1143.
3. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992,
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earlier in the decade had not been without controversy either
domestically4 or abroad,5 but since the Seattle WTO protests
in the last weeks of 1999, advocates of free trade have
experienced a decade of failed initiatives, limited victories,
and significant setbacks. At the global level, the WTO's Doha
Round of negotiations, launched in 2001, finally collapsed in
2008.6 At the regional level, the passage of the Central
American Free Trade Agreement ("CAFTA") in 2005' followed
the breakdown of talks aimed at creating a Free Trade Area
of the Americas ("FTAA") encompassing virtually the entire
Western Hemisphere.' More recently, despite the recent
approval of a free trade agreement with Peru,9 the approval of
significant bilateral free trade agreements between the
United States and countries such as Korea,1 ° Panama, and
32 I.L.M. 289.
4. See WILLIAM GREIDER, ONE WORLD, READY OR NOT: THE MANIC LOGIC
OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM 195 (1997); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND
ITS DISCONTENTS 4 (2002).
5. For example, the Zapatista Army for National Liberation chose January
1, 1994, the day the North American Free Trade Agreement first took effect, to
launch their uprising in the southern Mexican state of Chiapas. JOHN
WOMACK, JR., REBELLION IN CHIAPAS: AN HISTORICAL READER 42 (1999).
Fourteen years later, the lifting of Mexican tariffs on corn imports as scheduled
under NAFTA generated anti-NAFTA demonstrations by farmers across
Mexico, culminating in a major demonstration in Mexico City. Hector Tobar,
Mexican Farmers Protest NAFTA, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2008, at A3; see also
Farmers Clog Mexico City in Corn Tariff Protest, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Jan.
31, 2008,
http://afp.google.comarticle/ALeqM5hDUCfa3JCjUuDZcRUdkTGGP3dRvg.
6. Stephen Castle & Mark Landler, After Seven Years, Talks Collapse on
World Trade, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2008, at Al; see also Sungjoon Cho, Doha's
Development, 25 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 165, 165 (2007) ("On July 28, 2006, the
General Council of the World Trade Organization (WTO) indefinitely suspended
the Doha Round negotiation as members failed to reconcile differences in their
positions on key issues such as farm tariffs and agricultural subsidies. After
the negotiation was resumed, only nominally, in February 2007, it has still
remained deadlocked, failing to deliver any significant progresses.").
7. Central American Free Trade Agreement, Aug. 2, 2005, 43 I.L.M. 514.
8. See Mark Weisbrot, Changes in Latin America: Consequences for Human
Development, 37 INT'L J. HEALTH SERVS. 477, 491-92 (2007).
9. See Steven Weisman, Senate Votes to Approve Trade Deal with Peru,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2007, at B3.
10. See Daniel Altman, Switching Tracks with a South Korean Pact, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 8, 2007, at B5 (hailing the United States-Korea Free Trade
Agreement as "the most important step in the nation's trade policy since the
North American Free Trade Agreement went into effect 13 years ago"). But see
Martin Fackler, South Korean Lawmakers Clash Over Fate of Trade Deal with
U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2008, at A22 (detailing obstacles to passage of the
agreement both in the United States and Korea).
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Columbia has stalled," coinciding with a push for alternative
trading arrangements by key trading partners. 12  Even the
annual meetings of the pro-free-trade World Economic Forum
in the ski resort of Davos, Switzerland, are now countered by
a World Social Forum.13 And fifteen years after its passage,
the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA")
remained a controversial topic during the 2008 presidential
election. 14
11. But see Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Bush Claims Modest Gains for Agenda in
Peru, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2008, at A12 (describing the failure of "the
Democratic Congress . . . to pass free trade pacts with Columbia, South Korea,
and Panama").
12. See Janette Habel, Independence in the Continental Backyard: Latin
America Breaks Free of the US, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, ENGLISH EDITION,
Jan. 2008, at 1 (Harry Forster trans.), available at
http://mondediplo.com/2008/01/05/latinamerica (discussing Venezuela's
Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas).
13. See Ignacio Ramonet, The Promise of Porto Alegre, LE MONDE
DIPLOMATIQUE, ENGLISH EDITION, Jan. 2001, at 1 (Ed Emery trans.), available
at http://mondediplo.com/2001/01/01I/portoalegre ("This dissident International
will be held at the same time as the World Economic Forum meets in Davos.").
The movement "against" free trade and globalization has various names, such
as "antiglobalization" in English, altermondialisation or "alternative
globalization" in French, and globalisierungskritiker or "globalization critical" in
German, and represents a complex assemblage of movements not easily reduced
to a single characterization. See Robert Howse, The End of the Globalization
Debate: A Review Essay, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1528, 1530 (2008) (reviewing RAWI
ABDELAL, CAPITAL RULES: THE CONSTRUCTION OF GLOBAL FINANCE (2007);
JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION (2007); SASKIA SASSEN,
TERRITORY, AUTHORITY RIGHTS: FROM MEDIEVAL TO GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES
(2006); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK (2006)) ("Today the
protestors who march against globalization are not marching in favor of the
state. Instead, they are mostly advancing a set of values and causes that
transcend state boundaries and that require global action."). Part IV.A will
discuss alternative approaches to reforming international trade that
alternatively propose a reinfusion of the state's power to engage in economic
and social protection through "deglobalization" and stronger incorporation of
labor and environmental protections in trade agreements through "linkage."
14. See, e.g., Julie Bosman, Clinton Criticizes Obama over Fliers on Trade
Sent to Voters in Ohio, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2008, at A21 (reporting that two
weeks before the Ohio primary, Democratic presidential candidate Hillary
Clinton attacked opponent Barack Obama for distributing a flier citing an
article "that says Mrs. Clinton believed that the North American Free Trade
Agreement was a 'boon' for the economy" as part of her "strenuous[]" attempt to
distance herself from NAFTA, which was passed during her husband's
presidency); Patrick Healy & Jeff Zeleny, Democrats Clash on Trade, Health,
and Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2008, at Al ("In some of her strongest
language to date, [Hillary Clinton] said at the debate that she would 'opt out' of
[NAFTA] if Canada and Mexico did not renegotiate it."). But see Michael Luo,
Memo Gives Canada's Account of Obama Campaign's Meeting on Nafta, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 4, 2008, at A17. According to an Associated Press report, a
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This article seeks to place the ongoing debate over free
trade in constitutional context by exploring the implications
of insights drawn from reading constitutional history in the
context of changes in the international political economy
scholarship wrought by "globalization." Such a reading yields
significant insights for the emerging genre of constitutional
scholarship aimed at using constitutional politics to explore
new ways of understanding constitutionalism and
constitutional meaning.'5 NAFTA itself has already provided
fodder for a skirmish that approached this terrain. As
President Bill Clinton presented NAFTA to Congress as a
congressional-executive agreement (requiring simple
majorities in both the House of Representatives and the
Senate for passage16), and not a treaty (which would have
required the concurrence of "two thirds of the Senators
present""), a constitutional debate raged among
constitutional scholars Laurence Tribe, Bruce Ackerman, and
David Golove. Tribe disagreed vigorously with Ackerman and
Golove over the constitutionality of NAFTA's passage as a
congressional-executive agreement instead of as a treaty,
with the debate taking place in front of a congressional
subcommittee 18 and then, after NAFTA's passage, in the
memorandum by a Canadian consular official reporting on a meeting between
Canadian officials and presidential candidate Barack Obama's senior economic
policy advisor, University of Chicago economics professor Austan Goolsbee,
stated: "On Nafta Goolsbee suggested Obama is less about fundamentally
changing the agreement and more in favor of strengthening/clarifying language
on labor mobility and environment and trying to establish these as more 'core'
principles of the agreement." Id.
15. See generally Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality and National
Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 330 (2006). See also Robin West, A Response to
Goodwin Liu, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 157 (2006), available at
http://thepocketpart.org/2006/l1/21/west.html. Part IV.C will also go beyond
Liu's focus on "the effect of constitutionalism on legislative decision-making
rather than the effect of constitutionalism on adjudicated constitutional law,"
id., also to consider briefly how the courts might also have a role in the debate
over some fundamental rights issues raised by free trade agreements.
16. JOHN H. JACKSON, WILLIAM J. DAVEY & ALAN 0. SYKES, JR., LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND
TEXT ON THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 92 (4th ed., 2002).
17. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
18. See GATT Implementing Legislation: Hearings on S. 2467 before the S.
Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 103d Cong. 285-339 (1994)
(statements and testimony of Laurence Tribe and Bruce Ackerman).
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pages of the Harvard Law Review.19 This article revisits their
debate and situates it within the history of the governance of
the international political economy since the Great
Depression and World War II. Reading the Treaty Clause in
conjunction with this history and constitutional provisions
that were transformed by the New Deal's constitutional
revolution provides a new way beyond the constitutional
impasse reached by Tribe, Ackerman, and Golove.
Tribe, Ackerman, and Golove presented two diametrically
opposed perspectives on the constitutionality of using the
congressional-executive agreement procedure for agreements
such as NAFTA and the WTO agreements, which led to the
creation of the WTO.2 ° Tribe staked out a position of "treaty
exclusivity," arguing that the Treaty Clause's requirement
that two-thirds of the senators present approve treaties
proscribed full-stop the use of the congressional-executive
agreement procedure for international agreements.21
Ackerman and Golove drew on Ackerman's theory of
constitutional amendments outside of the formal amendment
process of Article V22 to defend the prevailing position that
"the Congressional-Executive agreement can be used as an
alternative to the treaty method in every instance."23
Ackerman and Golove argued that the new internationalism
(and renewed international economic liberalism) of the post-
World War II period constitutionalized the use of the
congressional-executive agreement form as a substitute for
19. See Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108
HARV. L. REV. 799 (1995); BRUCE ACKERMAN & DAVID GOLOVE, Is NAFTA
CONSTITUTIONAL? (1995); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure
Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108
HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1223 (1995).
20. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, supra note 2.
21. See generally infra Part I.C. See also Tribe, supra note 19, at 1278
("[T]extual and structural considerations leave no genuine doubt as to the
exclusivity of the Treaty Clause.").
22. Ackerman draws on the history of the New Deal period to argue that
"We the People" amended the Constitution outside of the formal Article V
amendment process through an act of "higher lawmaking" that rose to the level
of a "constitutional moment," equaling the Constitutional Convention and the
passage of Reconstruction Amendments. See Ackerman and Golove, supra note
19, at 873. See generally infra Part I.C.
23. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 303 cmt. e (1987).
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use of the Treaty Clause without restriction.2 4
Drawing on constitutional history and international
political economy scholarship, this article will identify a new,
middle-ground position between Tribe's position of "treaty
exclusivity" and Ackerman and Golove's position advocating
the "complete interchangeability" of treaties and
congressional-executive agreements. This middle ground will
emerge by first following Ackerman and Golove's approach of
exploring the constitutional history of the New Deal and
initial postwar periods to ascertain the contours of postwar
international economic liberalism. Ackerman and Golove's
argument here depends on their proposition that the New
Deal's constitutional revolution actually amended the
Constitution itself, with wide-ranging implications such as
the constitutionalization of national economic and social
regulation and the expansive administrative state.2 ' As legal
historian William Forbath notes, however, Ackerman does
not explore the full implications of his theory: he is correct
that the New Deal's constitutional revolution entailed a vast
expansion of federal regulatory power over economic and
social issues, but he fails to acknowledge the purpose behind
this expansion of federal power, which is "the recognition of
new rights and new rights-bearers."26 Forbath convincingly
argues that these "new rights" are those entailed by social
citizenship,27  such as the economic and social rights
24. The end of World War II saw a concerted international effort to rebuild
an international economy based on freer trade in reaction to the economic
isolationism of the 1930s. Importantly, this renewed commitment to "free
trade" had a much greater social component than the contemporary conception
of free trade. See generally infra Part II.A (detailing the postwar project of
"embedded liberalism").
25. Ackerman lays out his general theory in three key publications (so far-
a third book should be forthcoming): Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional
Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453 (1989) [hereinafter Ackerman,
Constitutional Politics /Constitutional Law]; BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1993) [herinafter ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS]; and
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998) [hereinafter
ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS].
26. William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 67 (1999) [hereinafter Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship]; see
also William E. Forbath, The New Deal Constitution in Exile, 51 DUKE L.J. 165
(2001) [hereinafter Forbath, New Deal Constitution in Exile].
27. See Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, supra note 26, at 166.
See generally Kenneth Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977).
[V01:49
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announced by President Franklin Roosevelt in his 1944 State
of the Union speech enumerating a Second Bill of Rights.28
Following Forbath's understanding of the constitutional
changes ushered in by the New Deal, the implications for the
Treaty Clause of these economic and social rights become
apparent when considered in the context of a more nuanced
picture of the United States' general commitment to
international economic liberalism after World War II.
Agreements, such as the original Bretton Woods Agreement29
and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"),30
that promote an international political economy that enables
domestic governments to protect and enforce economic and
social rights-agreements based on the principle of
"embedded liberalism"31
-are entitled to the more relaxed
congressional-executive agreement form, while agreements
such as NAFTA, under which the rights of investors are
paramount 32 -orthodox liberal, or "neoliberal,"
33
agreements-still must pass through the Treaty Clause's
more demanding requirements.
Thus emerges a limiting condition on the use of
congressional-executive agreements for international trade
agreements that is not as restrictive as Tribe's total
prohibition, nor as permissive as Ackerman and Golove's free-
for-all. The implications are far-reaching. Presidents should
only present neoliberal trade agreements to Congress as
treaties, and members of Congress should not vote for
neoliberal trade agreements that do not take the treaty
form2 The courts, on the other hand, first must grapple with
28. See generally CASS SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR's
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT Now MORE THAN EVER (2004);
see also infra Part II.A.
29. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund ("Bretton
Woods Agreement"), Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39.
30. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pt. 5,
55 U.N.T.S. 194.
31. For an extended discussion of "embedded liberalism," see infra Part II.A.
32. See Stephen Gill, Globalization, Market Civilization, and Disciplinary
Neoliberalism, 24 MILLENNIUM: J. INT'L STUD. 399, 413 (1995) (arguing that the
"new constitutionalism" of neoliberalism is a project which privileges the rights
of investors over all others, in contrast to "traditional notions of
constitutionalism," which "are associated with political rights, obligations, and
freedoms, and procedures that give institutional form to the state").
33. For an extended discussion of"neoliberalism," see infra Part II.B.
34. See generally Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978) (arguing
723
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Forbath's account of constitutional meaning in the arena of
economic and social rights-including a number of
problematic judicial precedents limiting the reach of
constitutional provisions that might otherwise recognize and
protect economic and social rights3 -before they can provide
judicial review of the political branches' choice of form for
international trade agreements.
This middle-ground approach offers the benefit of
providing acknowledging concerns about fidelity to
constitutional history-an acceptance of Ackerman's general
method of understanding constitutional change outside of
Article V, if not his ultimate conclusions-and
acknowledgement of concerns, such as those voiced by Tribe,
about constitutional text and structure-a meaningful
restriction on the use of congressional-executive agreements
and a reinvestment of meaning in the Treaty Clause. This
approach takes seriously the revolutionary character of the
New Deal's "constitutional revolution" and its implications in
the arena of international affairs while respecting, as Tribe
insists, that "the American people . . . [are] entitled to the
safeguards provided by the Senate supermajority
requirement of the Treaty Clause."36 Indeed, "safeguard" is
an excellent watchword for this approach, which makes
harder the passage of "NAFTA-style" agreements, trade deals
that undermine the economic and social rights of the
American people, while preserving access to the
congressional-executive agreement form for agreements that
enable the protection and enforcement of these rights. 7
certain constitutional norms may be underenforced by the Supreme Court
because of perceived institutional limitations on the part of the Court).
35. See infra Part I.B.
36. Tribe, supra note 19, at 1282.
37. Since the emergence of neoliberalism in the 1970s, and despite
significant productivity gains, median wages for American workers have
stagnated, resulting in the widest wealth gap since 1929 (in 2005, 21.5 percent
of national income went to the top one percent of the population). ROBERT B.
REICH, SUPERCAPITALISM: THE TRANSFORMATION OF BUSINESS, DEMOCRACY,
AND EVERYDAY LIFE 3-4, 105-08 (2007). Such trends in inequality have far-
reaching consequences for the economic and social rights of workers largely
dependent on earnings to fulfill the needs of their families in, for example, the
areas of healthcare, education, and housing. They also stand in stark contrast
to the period of embedded liberalism that featured significantly less inequality
and a mass production system that "generated a larger proportion of good-
paying jobs than before or since, and more economic security than ever for more
... people." Id. at 15.
[Vo1:49
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This article proceeds in four parts. Part I surveys the
scope of recent NAFTA-style congressional-executive
agreements and reviews the Tribe-Ackerman/Golove debate
over the constitutionality of congressional-executive
agreements. Part II reviews scholarship regarding the two
variants of postwar liberalism, embedded liberalism and
neoliberalism. Part III develops a conception of constitutional
political economy rooted in the Constitution's substantive
rights-giving provisions, such as the Fourteenth
Amendment," using Forbath's constitutional history to shed
light on whether international agreements of each variant
might have a claim, based in constitutional history, to
lessened constitutional requirements by following Forbath's
helpful corrective of the historical shortcomings of
Ackerman's theory of constitutional moments. Part IV begins
by assessing the two approaches to postwar liberalism in the
context of the relationship of each to economic and social
rights, and concludes by considering two possible remedies for
congressional-executive agreements that exceed the
permissible bounds of constitutional political economy but
that are nonetheless negotiated by the President and
presented to Congress for approval-congressional rejection
and judicial review.
I. CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS,
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, AND THE TRIBE-
ACKERMAN/GOLOVE DEBATE
A. Congressional-Executive Agreements and the New "Free
Trade"
In recent decades, the rise of economic globalization has
produced profound political-economic changes, including a
push for a new generation of further-reaching free trade
agreements, of which NAFTA and the WTO agreements are
prime examples. 9 The congressional-executive agreement
38. This approach is in contrast to analyses of the constitutional issues
raised by international governance that focus on structural provisions of the
Constitution and separation-of-powers concerns. See, e.g., Julian Ku, The
Delegation of Federal Powers to International Organizations: New Problems
with Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 71 (2000).
39. See Howse, supra note 13, at 1529-30 ("Throughout much of the
political spectrum, support declined for command-and-control regulation, trade
725
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has been the preferred procedural vehicle for the approval of
the international agreements that have reshaped the
architecture of the international political economy.4 °
According to Chantal Thomas, permissive use of
congressional-executive agreements in the arena of
international economic relations in recent decades has led to
the construction of a distinct "international branch" of the
federal government that is of constitutional concern." Just
as the so-called "fourth branch" of the federal government-
the administrative state-resulted from the "massive
legislative delegations of the 1920's and 1930's," as modified
by the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946,42 Thomas
argues that "the construction of the international branch
began with the massive delegations of the 1990's to the WTO
and NAFTA."43
Since multilateral trade negotiations began to falter in
the late-1990s, and in particular after the protests at the
WTO's Seattle Ministerial Conference in late 1999, which
effectively marked the end of progress on efforts to expand
the scope of the WTO to cover new areas,44 there has been a
pronounced move to bilateral trade agreements on the part of
the United States. The recent agreement with Peru, and
smaller regional trade agreements along the lines of NAFTA,
such as CAFTA, exemplify this trend. Some of the more
ambitious recent efforts, such as the FTAA, have failed,45 as
did the global Multilateral Agreement on Investment ("MAI")
in the late-1990s. 46  Despite these setbacks, the agreements
protectionism and capital controls as instruments of progressive governance
that assured the state's ability to maintain a stable and fair social contract with
business, labor, and the disadvantaged. The regulatory reforms of the Carter
Administration in the United States . . . are examples of the trends in
question.") (citation omitted).
40. See Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties' End: The Past, Present, and Future of
International Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1252-53
(2008).
41. Chantal Thomas, Constitutional Change and International Government,
52 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 2 (2000).
42. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. § 500 (2006).
43. Thomas, supra note 41, at 40.
44. Id. at 1 ("Seattle shattered the conventional wisdom that only policy
wonks are interested in trade barriers.").
45. See Larry Rohter, Bush Faces Tough Time in South America, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 2, 2005, at A12 (noting the passing of a 2005 deadline for approving
the FTAA).
46. See Sol Picciotto, Introduction: What Rules for the Global Economy, in
[Vo1:49726
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passed so far have introduced "a considerable body of
international law" regulating the domestic economy through
"legal rules that affect our everyday lives-the food we eat,
the clothes we wear, the price of medicine, and the taxes we
pay. 4 7 Thomas concludes that "the change is so deep that it
is constitutional."48
For Thomas, the delegation of national regulatory
prerogatives to NAFTA-style international trade agreements
(and international organizations created by such
agreements)49 is even more problematic because of the use of
the "fast track procedure" established by the Trade Act of
1974,"0 through which Congress limits itself to an "up-or-
down" vote on international trade agreements presented to it
by the President with no option of amending them. According
to Thomas, this double delegation, first from Congress to the
President and then from the President to international
bodies, "arguably is more extreme than any delegation of
congressional power in the domestic context."51 Part IV.A will
address the sovereignty and separation-of-powers concerns
raised by this double delegation in the context of possible
alternative approaches to contemporary free trade
agreements. In this part, the focus shall be on the
REGULATING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: BEYOND LIBERALIZATION 1, 13 (Sol
Picciotto & Ruth Mayne eds., 2001) ("A major criticism of the MAI is that states
would be locked in to its liberalization and investment protection obligations,
which would potentially over-ride a wide range of national laws. Since the MAI
envisaged direct access to international arbitration by investors, it would make
these arbitrators the judges of the validity of any national laws which might be
considered contrary to the MAI's principles.") (citation omitted); see also PETER
PHILLIPS & PROJECT CENSORED, CENSORED 1998: THE NEWS THAT DIDN'T
MAKE THE NEWS-THE YEAR'S TOP 25 CENSORED STORIES (1999) (arguing the
Multilateral Agreement on Investment was the most underreported story of
1998 in the major news media of the United States).
47. Thomas, supra note 40, at 2.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 26-32 (noting that there was a congressional debate over the use
of the congressional-executive agreement form for NAFTA and the WTO but
that ultimately "these inquiries were put aside because of the overwhelming
pressure to approve the agreement"). The Tribe-Ackerman/Golove debate will
be reviewed in detail later in the next section. See infra Part I.B.
50. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2101 (2006).
51. Thomas, supra note 41, at 26; see, e.g., id. at 26-32 (discussing double
delegation of power from Congress to the President to international
organizations to make rules governing foreign commerce); see also Chantal
Thomas, Challenges for Democracy and Trade: The Case of the United States, 41
HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (2004); infra Part IV.A.
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congressional-executive agreement form itself, which seems
to conflict directly with an express constitutional provision-
the Treaty Clause.
Leaving aside concerns about the procedures used by
Congress to approve recent trade agreements, Thomas
argues, "Economic globalization represents a profound social
change, and, as such, has required a fundamental alteration
of governmental structure-the incorporation into the
national government of substantial regulation from
international organizations whose mandate is to liberalize
economic flow across borders."52 This development implicates
the Constitution because "[tihe rise of international economic
organizations has yielded a source of regulation so significant
that it is a fundamental alteration of the constitution of the
federal government."5 3 Thomas cites the WTO as "the largest
example of this 'international branch' of federal government,"
but remarks that NAFTA "is also impressive in its regulatory
scope, affecting not only trade but also investment and even
the movement of persons."54 This article will restrict its
analysis to international trade agreements such as NAFTA
and the WTO and consider other aspects of the architecture of
the international political economy, such as international
finance, only in the context of these NAFTA-style agreements.
While international economic agreements are nothing
new, the new generation of so-called "free trade" agreements,
including the WTO agreements and NAFTA, are qualitatively
broader in scope and reach substantially deeper into the
national economy. At the conclusion of World War II, world
leaders met in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, to construct a
new international economic architecture, including the
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and the Bretton Woods
system of fixed exchange rates. Thomas notes, "The economic
commitments required by those early organizations, however,
were substantially fewer than those now required by NAFTA
and the WTO, and were much less important than their
modern-day counterparts in shaping domestic economic
regulation."55 As a result, she seeks to "[challenge] the notion
52. Thomas, supra note 40, at 3.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 3-4.
55. Id. at 5.
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that the immediate postwar support for United States
participation in such organizations as the International
Monetary Fund... provides the legitimacy for organizations
such as NAFTA and the WTO."56 In particular, she takes aim
at the work of Ackerman and Golove, who argue the
"constitutional consensus" of the 1940s similarly covers
agreements such as NAFTA and the WTOY' As noted in the
introduction, this article will continue this project by drawing
on international political economy scholarship concerning the
period since World War II, and constitutional history
scholarship, to question the purported "constitutional
consensus" to which Ackerman and Golove refer, with the aim
of deepening the inquiry into the constitutionality of the
"international branch" and the agreements that constitute it.
In the past three or four decades, the right-libertarianism
of the Chicago School, through the discipline of "law and
economics," has introduced a market-friendly approach that
has profoundly influenced legal analysis and doctrine. 58  As
Part II explores in depth, political economists working outside
the narrow laissez-faire framework of neoclassical economics
have developed a more holistic understanding of the
development of the international political economy since
World War 11.'9 In addition to "embedded liberalism" and
"neoliberalism," scholars variously refer to the two periods of
political-economic governance as, for example, the "Keynesian
Welfare State" and the "Schumpeterian Workfare State,"' or
"Fordism" and "Post-Fordism."61 These later terms better
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Martha McCluskey, Law and Economic Justice: Toward a
Critical Field Guide 1 (May 2008) (unpublished manuscript on file with author)
(suggesting that law and economics "should also be translated as Law and
Economic Injustice or Law and Economic Subordination").
59. See, e.g., EMMA COLEMAN JORDAN & ANGELA P. HARRIS, BEYOND
RATIONAL CHOICE: ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON ECONOMICS 164, 254-55
(2006) (introducing both internal and external critiques of neoclassical
economics).
60. See, e.g., Bob Jessop, Towards a Schumpeterian Workfare State?
Preliminary Remarks on Post-Fordist Political Economy, 40 STUD. POL. ECON. 7,
9 (1993) ("In abstract terms, the distinctive objectives of the [Keynesian Welfare
State] regarding economic and social reproduction were to promote full
employment in a relatively closed national economy primarily through demand-
side management, and to generalize norms of mass consumption through
welfare rights and new forms of collective consumption.").
61. Ash Amin, Post-Fordism: Models, Fantasies and Phantoms of
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capture the complexity of how states have managed their
domestic political-economic affairs during these two distinct
periods. For present purposes, however, the terms
"embedded liberalism" and "neoliberalism" are most helpful
because they allow a focus on the architecture and organizing
principles of the international political economy instead of
domestic political-economic management. The conception of
constitutional political economy that emerges from
engagement with this broader tradition of political economy
scholarship may also have the potential to shed light on
issues beyond the scope of this article.62
B. Treaties, Congressional-Executive Agreements, and
Constitutional Practice
The last seventy years have witnessed an explosion of
congressional-executive agreements. While the United States
entered into sixty treaties (including the Louisiana Purchase
and the Jay and Pinckney Treaties) and twenty-seven non-
treaty international agreements over the course of the
Constitution's first fifty years (between 1789 and 1839), over
the course of the fifty-year period from 1939 until 1989 the
United States entered into 702 treaties and 11,698 non-treaty
international agreements.6 3 Thus, while sixty-nine percent of
international agreements during the first period were Article
II treaties, during the second period, following the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Belmont,64 which is
commonly understood to stand for the proposition that
congressional-executive agreements are constitutionally
permissible,65 ninety-four percent were not.66 There has been
Transition, in POST-FORDISM: A READER 1 (Ash Amin ed., 1994).
62. See, e.g., Angela Harris, Margaretta Lin & Jeff Selbin, From "The Art of
War" to "Being Peace": Mindfulness and Community Lawyering in a Neoliberal
Age, 95 CAL. L. REV. 2073, 2081-93 (2007) (contrasting two periods of the
political economy of Oakland, California: 1950-1980 and 1980-present, and
stressing the substantial inequality that existed even during the earlier period
and accelerated during the later period).
63. John C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of the
Congressional-Executive Agreements, 99 MICH. L. REV. 757, 766 (2001) (citing
Congressional Research Service studies); see also Hathaway, supra note 40, at
1286-88 n.130 (analyzing Congressional Research Service studies and data
from an unpublished U.S. Department of State memorandum).
64. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937).
65. Hathaway, supra note 40, at 1338-39 n.298 (noting that Belmont "has
been read to sanction executive agreements and to give them the force of
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little study of whether certain subjects are more likely to
receive treaty treatment than others, 7 but it is apparent that
the congressional-executive agreement is now a major
cornerstone of the international economic relations of the
United States. Indeed, as Hathaway notes in her recent
survey of the literature on congressional-executive
agreements, "[recent work often stops at the observation that
trade is an area in which congressional-executive agreements
are prominent, whereas human rights and arms control are
areas in which treaties are more common."'68
supreme law of the land") (internal quotations marks and citation omitted)).
The central issue in Belmont was whether the international agreement trumped
New York state law. The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative: "Plainly,
the external powers of the United States are to be exercised without regard to
state laws or policies." Belmont, 301 U.S. at 331. The Supreme Court extended
this rule regarding "[tihe supremacy of a treaty" to the executive agreement at
issue in Belmont and "all international compacts and agreements ... [because]
complete power over international affairs is in the national government." Id.;
see also B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583, 601 (1912) (finding that
a "a compact authorized by the Congress of the United States, negotiated and
proclaimed under the authority of its President ... is a treaty under the Circuit
Court of Appeals Act" for purposes of determining the proper court to hear an
appeal). As discussed in Part I.C, Ackerman and Golove regard the argument
that these and other decisions established the constitutionality of congressional-
executive agreements to be "constitutional myth-making." Ackerman & Golove,
supra note 19, at 813-14 ("[T]he congressional-executive agreement involves
interbranch cooperation. This simple point does great damage to the myth.
Many of the standard cases the New Dealers used to build their pedigree did
not involve any form of institutional interaction. Instead, the New Dealers cited
countless cases of unilateralism, executive or legislative, as if they served as
precedents for a novel form of congressional-executive interaction that could
substitute for the traditional treaty."). Ackerman and Golove reasoned that the
holding in Altman "was entirely sensible, but it did not constitute-as later
commentators asserted-an effort to make substantive law and vindicate the
constitutional interchangeability of treaties and congressional-executive
agreements. To the contrary, the Court expressly indicated that the Secretary's
agreement with France lacked 'the dignity' of a treaty." Id. at 831.
66. Tim Wu, Treaties'Domain, 93 VA. L. REV. 571, 645-46 (2007).
67. Yoo, supra note 63, at 763 n.16 ("As far as I can tell, no legal scholar has
attempted to conduct an empirical survey of the use of treaties versus
congressional-executive agreements to regulate different subjects.").
68. Hathaway, supra note 40, at 1252-53. Hathaway reviews the work on
this question by Yoo, Peter Spiro, and Steve Charnovitz. See id. at 1253 nn.41-
42. See generally Steve Charnowitz, The NAFTA Environmental Side
Agreement: Implications for Environmental Cooperation, Trade Policy, and
American Treatymaking, 8 TEMP. IN'L & COMP. L.J. 257 (1994); Peter J. Spiro,
Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Constitutional Method, 79 TEX. L. REV. 961
(2001); Yoo, supra note 63. Hathaway also notes that the United States is
almost alone in having two different procedures for engaging in what she calls
"international lawmaking." Hathaway, supra note 40, at 1238-39 ("It is
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Hathaway argues that the explanation for this
"haphazard" state of affairs is rooted in historical accident
instead of some rational organizational scheme. The
contemporary pairings of subject matter to form of
international agreement emerged from consideration of
various versions of the "Bricker Amendment," which were
presented by Senator John Bricker in the 1950s in an effort to
curtail the use of congressional-executive agreements.69
Hathaway notes that these amendments were "aimed to
prevent the United States from entering international human
rights agreements that some feared would be used to
challenge segregation and Jim Crow."7" The Bricker
Amendment was defeated pursuant to a compromise by which
"future human rights agreements . . . would henceforth be
concluded only as treaties that had been rendered almost
entirely unenforceable through reservations, understandings,
and declarations."71 This problematic compromise is past due
for reconsideration more than forty years after the Civil
Rights movement brought an end to de jure segregation and
Jim Crow.
Regardless of subject matter, and despite real-world
practice, over the decades since World War II a near-
consensus has emerged among scholars and practitioners of
foreign relations law that congressional-executive agreements
and treaties are fully interchangeable, thus rendering the
Treaty Clause virtually a dead letter. The Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
sums up this consensus thusly: "the prevailing view is that
the Congressional-Executive agreement can be used as an
alternative to the treaty method in every instance."72 This
consensus actually applies to three different types of
international agreements: (1) presidential-executive
agreements whereby the President, without any participation
from Congress, accepts an agreement; (2) congressional-
executive agreements authorizing the President to enter into
puzzling that two distinct methods of lawmaking operate side-by-side within a
single nation-all the more so because virtually no other country deals with
international law as we do.").
69. See Hathaway, supra note 40, at 1240.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1240-41.
72. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 303 cmt. e (1987).
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an international agreement before the fact; and (3)
congressional-executive agreements negotiated by the
President and then approved by Congress.73 This paper will
only concern itself with the third type of agreement-
congressional-executive agreements negotiated by the
President and then approved by Congress-because they are
the form international trade agreements typically take and
most directly implicate the Treaty Clause. Moreover, as John
Yoo argues, these NAFTA-style agreements do "not involve
the delegation of authority from Congress to the President,
but instead [seek] to replace the treaty process with a
statutory one."74  Regardless of their status under the
Constitution, the choice of the treaty or congressional-
executive agreement form is of no consequence under
international law, which considers both types of agreements
to be "treaties."75
The reigning consensus on interchangeability showed
some signs of strain in the debates over approval of the WTO
and NAFTA as congressional-executive agreements (indeed,
as already noted, Ackerman and Tribe debated this very issue
before a congressional subcommittee considering NAFTA),
although Congress ultimately approved the agreements as
presented.76 The federal courts have held that the questions
of the constitutionality of the congressional-executive
agreement form and whether an international agreement
must pass through the requirements of the Treaty Clause are
not justiciable because of the political question doctrine.77 For
73. JACKSON, DAvEY & SYKES, supra note 16, at 92. An example of the first
type of agreement would be a tactical military agreement under the
Commander-in-Chief Clause; an example of the second type would be "typical
trade agreements authority, such as section 101 of the Trade Act of 1974;" and
an example of the third type would be the Bretton Woods Agreements Act, 22
U.S.C. §§ 286-86x. Id. There are also treaty-executive agreements, treaties
that are approved by Congress but leave some details of implementation up to
the President. Id.
74. Yoo, supra note 63, at 765-66.
75. JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 16, at 92; see also Hathaway,
supra note 40, at 1324 ("Under international law, any subsequent effort to
withdraw from [a] treaty is governed by the treaty itself or, if it is silent on
withdrawal or revocation, by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.").
76. JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 16, at 93. The WTO agreement,
but not the NAFTA agreement, did in fact pass the Senate by more than the
two-thirds required by the Treaty Clause. Tribe, supra note 19, at 1227.
77. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
§ 2.8.1, at 127 (2d ed. 2002) ("[Tlhe 'political question doctrine' refers to subject
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example, a three-judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, in Made in the U.S.A. Foundation v. United States,
held that a challenge to the use of the congressional-executive
agreement form for NAFTA "presents a nonjusticiable
political question, thereby depriving the court of Article III
jurisdiction in this matter."v8 This article will ultimately
conclude that the reigning consensus on interchangeability
(which Ackerman and Golove's work seeks to support) lies on
suspect constitutional foundations and that Congress's equal
treatment of congressional-executive agreements-and even
the courts' invocation of the political question doctrine on this
issue-may be inappropriate. First, however, it is instructive
to review the Tribe-Ackerman/Golove debate over NAFTA,
the WTO, and the Treaty Clause, as well as the work of other
scholars who have also addressed this issue in the last
decade.
C. Congressional-Executive Agreements and the Tribe-
Ackerman / Golove Debate
The WTO and NAFTA agreements gave occasion to a
renewed challenge by Laurence Tribe to the reigning
consensus on the interchangeability of treaties and
congressional-executive agreements. Tribe's challenge went
so far as to suggest that congressional-executive agreements
are not ever permissible in place of the Treaty Clause
procedure,79 while Bruce Ackerman and David Golove
vigorously defended the reigning consensus using Ackerman's
theory of non-Article V constitutional amendment.80
matter that the Court deems to be inappropriate for judicial review."); see also
id. at § 2.8.4, at 140 ("The application of the political question doctrine to
foreign policy is extremely controversial. Some contend that it is appropriate
for the judiciary to stay out of foreign policy because of the greater knowledge
and expertise of the president and Congress in this area .... Yet, critics of the
political question doctrine argue that constitutional questions concerning
foreign affairs should be adjudicated.") (footnotes omitted).
78. Made in the U.S.A. Found. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300, 1319 (11th
Cir. 2001); see also id. at 1305 ("Remarkably, although perhaps not altogether
surprisingly, the United States Supreme Court has never in our nation's history
seen fit to address the question of what exactly constitutes and distinguishes
'treaties,' as that term is used in Art. II, § 2, from 'alliances,' 'confederations,'
'compacts,' or 'agreements,' as those terms are employed in Art. I, § 10.").
79. Tribe, supra note 19, at 1249.
80. See generally Ackerman & Golove, supra note 19. For a discussion of
Ackerman's theory of non-Article V constitutional amendment, see discussion
infra Part III.A.
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This debate between leading constitutional scholars
reached far beyond academia. Tribe and Ackerman testified
before a congressional subcommittee during the NAFTA
debate and submitted follow-up opinion letters."1 When the
Eleventh Circuit dismissed the challenge to NAFTA's form in
Made in the U.S.A. Foundation, it cited Ackerman and
Golove's work on NAFTA."2 Writing for the majority, Judge
Betty Binns Fletcher of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
who was sitting by designation, noted that Ackerman and
Golove's work informed her inquiry into "historical practice[,
which] may illuminate any prudential considerations
governing the advisability or inadvisability of judicial
intervention in a given controversy."8 3 While progress on
further talks at the World Trade Organization has been
minimal since the Seattle protests in 1999,4 trade issues
remain at the forefront and under vigorous debate. 5
For Tribe, the "line" between permissible non-treaty
international agreements, such as congressional-executive
agreements, and treaties "is the line between those
agreements the President may conclude with no ex post
approval by any legislative body, and those for which
supermajority Senate ratification is essential.8 6  He thus
arrives at a view of "treaty exclusivity," precluding the
congressional-executive agreement form, which requires ex
post congressional approval, for international trade
agreements such as the WTO and NAFTA" Tribe argues
that Ackerman and other proponents of the "prevailing view"
of interchangeability "have too quickly relied upon the broad
reach of Congress's Article I, section 8 power over foreign
commerce without adequately considering how their position
would mesh with the terms of other constitutional provisions
and with the architecture of decision making that those
provisions interact to define."88
81. GATT Implementing Legislation: Hearings on S. 2467 before the S.
Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 103d Cong., 285-339 (1994)
(statements and testimony of Laurence Tribe and Bruce Ackerman).
82. Made in the U.S.A. Found., 242 F.3d at 1311 n.27.
83. Id.
84. See Cho, supra note 6, at 165-66.
85. See supra notes 9-12.
86. Tribe, supra note 19, at 1234 n.47.
87. See id. at 1249.
88. Id. at 1250-51. Article 1, § 8 includes the Necessary and Proper Clause,
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Tribe goes on to attack Ackerman and Golove's reliance
on their "broad theory" of non-Article V constitutional
amendment and their failure to make any inquiry into the
terms of the WTO or NAFTA agreements. Tribe notes that
the Ackerman-Golove view-that the terms and aims of an
agreement are wholly irrelevant to whether the
congressional-executive agreement form is permissible-was
"not supported even by the administration that defended the
WTO and its consideration by both Houses of Congress."89
Part IV of this article will adopt Tribe's insistence on an
inquiry into the terms of an international trade agreement as
a key consideration in assessing the choice of its form.
Another area of focus for Tribe is Ackerman and Golove's
practice of reading Article I in isolation from Article II for the
purposes of interpreting Article I, section 8. He even argues
that under such a reading, "the Veto Override Clause would
seem to allow Congress to enter into international
agreements on its own (with appropriate supermajority
support)."9" Tribe suggests that reading Articles I and II
together, however, requires one to "address whether the
Treaty Clause of Article II places structural limits on
Congress's Article I powers. " 9' Citing Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Chadha,92  Tribe points out,
"congressional powers are not defined solely by Article I,
section 8, but are limited by other structural constraints in
the Constitution."9' He also cites New York v. United States94
for the proposition "that structural considerations outside of
Article I, section 8 limit congressional authority[, even in]
foreign affairs."9' Instead, Tribe argues, "the Treaty Clause,
however, provides Article II authority for the President and
the Senate together to exercise broader foreign affairs power
which provides Congress the power "to make all laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers," including the
power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations .... ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
89. Tribe, supra note 18, at 1251-52.
90. Id. at 1258.
91. Id.
92. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)
(striking down a provision that granted Congress a "legislative veto" over
actions by the Executive Branch).
93. Tribe, supra note 19, at 1259.
94. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
95. Tribe, supra note 19, at 1260.
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than that delegated to Congress in Article I, section 8."96
Finally, Tribe notes, "the Necessary and Proper Clause
merely permits Congress to 'make all Laws' ancillary to
executing the power delegated by the Foreign Commerce
Clause."97 Parts III and IV will argue that the Constitution's
substantive rights-giving provisions, such as the Fourteenth
Amendment's provisions for National Citizenship, Privileges
and Immunities, and Due Process, and the Ninth Amendment
should figure prominently into the constitutional debate over
the appropriate form for international trade agreements.
Tribe concludes that "[it is flatly inconsistent with Chief
Justice Marshall's legacy to conclude, from the absence of the
word 'only' in a constitutional delegation of power in Article II
or in Article III, that Congress enjoys a concurrent and
plenary authority to exercise parallel power under Article L""
As a result, Tribe contends, "[c]onstitutional scholars should
no longer treat as a foregone conclusion the
interchangeability of the congressional-executive agreement
with the treaty form. 9 Tribe also uses the debate over
congressional-executive agreements to launch a broader
attack on Ackerman's method: "the theory that constitutional
change can be constitutionally effected by a particular pattern
of events bearing no relation to the procedures of Article V-
is fundamentally flawed."100
While Tribe admits that his approach may seem "oddly
formalistic, " ' °' Ackerman and Golove's approach indulges in
the opposite vice: excessive permissiveness. Ackerman and
Golove sum up their approach when they quip, in remarking
upon the current interchangeability approach to the
congressional-executive agreements, "[tihe intentions of the
Framers have been redeemed-so long as we recognize the
relevant Framers were the Americans who fought the Second
World War and not those who fought the Revolution."1 2 They
reach this conclusion by extending Ackerman's theory of
constitutional amendment outside of Article V, which
96. Id. at 1260-61.
97. Id. at 1261. Tribe also points to support from the Framers, especially
Alexander Hamilton, for his view. Id. at 1261-62.
98. Id. at 1276.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1286.
101. Tribe, supra note 19, at 1249.
102. Ackerman & Golove, supra note 19, at 803.
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Ackerman first used to tackle the issue of the
constitutionality of the New Deal, national economic
regulation, and the expansive administrative state, to address
innovations in economic diplomacy after World War 11.1 °3 In
addition to an act of "higher lawmaking" by "We the
People" °4 during the New Deal/World War II period, however,
for Ackerman and Golove the constitutionalization of the
congressional-executive agreement procedure for agreements
such as NAFTA and the WTO also required the emergence of
a "professional consensus" on the demands of modern
economic diplomacy, codified in the Trade Act of 1974, nearly
three decades after the end of World War 11.105
Ackerman and Golove identify the origins of the
contemporary consensus regarding interchangeability with
the work of a "cadre" of legal scholars in the 1930s and 1940s
who sought to destabilize and supplant the then-consensus on
treaty exclusivity. 10 According to Ackerman and Golove,
these scholars worked to subvert the reigning consensus
through acts of "constitutional myth-making" and by
opportunistically seizing on and recasting ambiguous-and
sometimes not so ambiguous-language in Supreme Court
decisions and congressional actions that arguably suggested
an endorsement of the congressional-executive agreement
procedure. 0 7 Their efforts dovetailed with the efforts of New
Dealers outside the academy to cement the triumph of the
new consensus in the wake of what Ackerman and Golove call
the "triggering election" of 1944.1°8 By the time of the
Truman administration, "[i]nterchangeability had become
part of the living Constitution. " 1 9 As Ackerman and Golove
note, however, "[t]he birth of the congressional-executive
agreement was a self-conscious, but ad hoc process""' that
did not conclude in 1944. Instead, "[olver the next half-
century, Congress consolidated these precedents by passing
103. See id. at 907-11.
104. See infra Part III.A (reviewing Ackerman's theory of non-Article V
constitutional amendment).
105. Ackerman & Golove, supra note 19, at 803.
106. See id. at 813.
107. Id. at 805-61.
108. Id. at 866-96. For a more in-depth discussion of the significance of
"triggering elections" for Ackerman's theory, see infra Part III.A.
109. Ackerman & Golove, supra note 19, at 896.
110. Id. at 897.
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statutes that used the congressional-executive agreement as a
tool for the control of foreign policy."'11
Ultimately, according to Ackerman and Golove, it was
from the Trade Act of 1974, wherein "Congress and the
President created a structure for trade negotiations that is far
superior to the one envisioned by the Framers of the
Constitution in 1787," that the modern consensus on
interchangeability emerged." 2 This "far superior" structure
allows increased formal ex ante consultations between the
President and Congress regarding a trade agreement and the
"fast-track" procedure to prevent Congress from amending
the agreement after its ratification.1 3  Of particular
importance for Ackerman and Golove is their view that this
framework "works," as evidenced by the passage of successive
far-reaching trade agreements, from the Tokyo Round of the
GATT in the 1970s to NAFTA." 4  It is notable that, while
Ackerman and Golove cite "ambitious" and "path-breaking"
free trade agreements that were approved by this
procedure, 115 they do not put forward any reason that the
Constitution should be particularly supportive of the passage
of agreements expanding free trade.
According to Ackerman and Golove, "[a]fter four years of
[war and] collective sacrifice, the majority of Americans had
become thoroughly convinced of the need to break from the
isolationist tradition set by Washington's Farewell Address
and symbolized by the Senate's rejection of the League of
Nations.' 1 6  Unfortunately, "[tihe rules for constitutional
amendment, however, provided inept mechanisms for
implementing this profound popular judgment.""7 Therefore,
Congress and the President enacted the will of the People and
"modernized the treaty-making system by adapting the
techniques they had used to transform domestic
constitutional law in the 1930s. After all, it was these New
Deal techniques that allowed the country to weather the
economic storms that had destroyed democracy in Europe. "118
111. Id.
112. Id. at 900.
113. Id. at 898, 905.
114. Id. at 906.
115. Ackerman & Golove, supra note 19, at 906.
116. Id. at 916.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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Ackerman and Golove conclude, regarding the use of the
techniques involved in the non-Article V approach to
amending the Constitution in the area of economic diplomacy,
"[i]t was therefore entirely appropriate to rely on them once
again to express the will of the people rather than place
undue pressure upon the peculiarly dysfunctional formalisms
of Article V." 9  Thus, Ackerman and Golove promote a
totally permissive approach with regard to congressional-
executive agreements, in diametric opposition to Tribe's
treaty exclusivity.
D. Postscripts to the Tribe-Ackerman! Golove Debate
In the years since Tribe, Ackerman, and Golove set forth
their positions, several other scholars, including Hathaway,
Peter Spiro, and Yoo, have revisited the issue. Yoo has
proposed a way past the impasse resulting from the Tribe-
Ackerman/Golove debate rooted in separation-of-powers
concerns and the Rehnquist Court's Commerce Clause
jurisprudence that emerged as part of the Rehnquist Court's
"new federalism" of the 1990s. 2 ' For Yoo, treaties are
necessary for international agreements that reach beyond
"Congress's enumerated authority," as defined by the
Rehnquist Court, including:
areas beyond the reach of the Commerce Clause, the
commandeering of the executive or legislative branches of
the state governments, overriding state sovereign
immunity in either federal or state court (when the
Reconstruction Amendments are not involved), and
expanding the constitutional definition of civil rights that
may apply against the states.
121
On the other hand, according to Yoo, "[ciongressional-
executive agreements still have a legitimate place in the
constitutional conduct of foreign policy, because their use
preserves Congress's constitutional powers over matters such
as international commerce." 22  Therefore, for Yoo, the
congressional-executive agreement procedure is permissible
for free trade agreements 2 3 but international agreements
119. Id.
120. Yoo, supra note 63, at 763.
121. Id. (footnotes omitted).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 823-24.
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protecting, for example, human rights, must pass through the
Treaty Clause's more stringent requirements. 124 As Part IV
will note, the "new federalism" jurisprudence on which Yoo's
analysis depends is problematic because it is internally
inconsistent and in conflict with constitutional history. To
the extent that it is currently the law of the Supreme Court,
Part IV will examine ways that it might be reconsidered.
Peter Spiro has also put forward a "separate spheres"125
approach.126 Like Yoo's approach, Spiro's approach also seeks
to articulate a justification for the subject-matter division
that is "largely descriptive."27 Under Spiro's "theory of
constitutional increments," Ackerman and Golove's account of
the postwar constitutional shift toward interchangeability
"comprised a big increment, perhaps the equivalent of a
landmark Supreme Court case.'"28 But Spiro goes further to
justify the contemporary constellation of pairings between
subject matter and form of international agreement as the
result of further refinement of the initial postwar increment
"by lesser episodes which have drawn a fairly clear line
between those contexts in which the treaty form must be used
and those in which it is optional or even unacceptable." 29
Spiro's approach takes into account "acceptance,
contestedness, age, and pedigree," ' 30 but, as Hathaway notes,
seems to share with Yoo's approach a primary interest in
justifying the status quo. 31
In the most recent postscript to the Tribe-
AckermanlGolove debate, Hathaway has put forward an
argument that the Treaty Clause should be abolished for all
but a few rare cases, none of which relate to international
trade.132  Hathaway argues that the congressional-executive
124. See id. at 826-28.
125. Hathaway describes the "separate spheres" approach as Yoo and Spiro's
attempt to identify certain spheres within which congressional-executive
agreements are acceptable while preserving others where treaties remain the
exclusive acceptable form. See Hathaway, supra note 40, at 1247-48.
126. See Spiro, supra note 68, at 910, 914..
127. Id. at 964.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1027, 1034.
131. Hathaway, supra note 40, at 1248 (quoting Alexander Pope for the
proposition that "whatever is, is right").
132. Id. at 1343-44 Hathaway's review of the debate over interchangeability
begins much earlier. See id. at 1244-46. For purposes of brevity, this article
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agreement procedure is superior to the Treaty Clause
procedure because it is easier to use, is more democratically
legitimate, creates stronger international commitments, and
is more consistent with the practices of other countries.133
According to Hathaway, a congressional-executive agreement
is more democratic because the procedure includes the House
of Representatives (which is more representative because
representatives are assigned by population), "is less subject
than is a treaty to stonewalling by an extreme minority,"
because it does not require a supermajority even in the
Senate, and "rarely requires the passage of separate
implementing legislation."13 4 Moreover, Hathaway notes that
a congressional-executive agreement "is often easier to
enforce and can be subject to more stringent rules regarding
unilateral withdrawal, thus allowing the United States to
make stronger and more consistent international
commitments.' 35
Hathaway's analysis, while backed by considerable
comparative, historical, and legal analysis, ultimately is
unconvincing. First, Hathaway's well-documented conclusion
that the "international lawmaking" system found in the
United States is nearly unique in the world and creates
weaker international commitments is an argument for
change, even constitutional change, but does not require such
change. Second, the challenges of the Treaty Clause
procedure's requirement of a supermajority in the Senate and
exclusion of the House of Representatives were apparent to
the Framers who fought the Revolutionary War and were
present at the Constitutional Convention in 1787 or, as
Ackerman and Golove prefer, "the [firamers who fought the
Second World War" and approved the U.N. Convention and
the Bretton Woods agreements. Indeed, any problematic
historical circumstances or assumptions attendant to the
consideration of the Treaty Clause in 1787136 by the 1940s
does not add to Hathaway's review of these older sources because the debate
between Tribe, Ackerman, and Golove provides a re-starting point for the
contemporary debate over the new generation of international trade agreements
exemplified by NAFTA and the WTO agreements.
133. See id. at 1242 ("The process for making international law that is
outlined in the U.S. Constitution is close to unique.").
134. Id. at 1241.
135. Id.
136. Hathaway argues that the original considerations behind the Treaty
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would themselves have been obsolete in deciding whether to
abolish it. The fact that the Treaty Clause continued to be
used suggests that even Ackerman and Golove's "Framers
who fought the Second World War" agreed with Tribe that, at
least in some circumstances, "the American people . . . [are]
entitled to the safeguards provided by the Senate
supermajority requirement of the Treaty Clause."137 The
purpose of this article is to determine precisely when the
safeguards of the Treaty Clause must be upheld in the area of
international trade by reading constitutional history together
with the history of the international political economy since
the key period of the Great Depression/World War II era.
As noted above, Tribe hints at another way past the
Treaty Clause-congressional-executive agreement impasse in
his admonition of Ackerman and Golove for not inquiring into
the terms of an agreement as part of their analysis. Yoo's
approach makes such an inquiry but his approach is
compromised by his reliance on problematic constitutional
doctrine. Spiro and Hathaway do not engage in such an
inquiry, at least as far as international trade agreements are
concerned. This article will argue that a careful examination
of the history and changing character of trade agreements
since World War II points the way to a middle ground
between Tribe's hyper-textualism and Ackerman and Golove's
hyper-permissiveness. Such an inquiry would first require an
understanding of precisely what is at stake with a particular
agreement. Therefore, Part II begins by reviewing
international political-economic history since World War II.
Second, such an inquiry would require translating the
experience of the New Deal period, and its attendant non-
Article V amendments, into comprehensible insights relevant
to understanding the New Deal Constitution drawn from the
initial postwar history of the international political economy.
Accordingly, Part III will explore the history and legacy of the
New Deal's "constitutional revolution" or, to use Ackerman's
terminology, "constitutional moment," before concluding that
the Constitution's substantive provisions, and especially the
Clause's supermajority requirement, "first, the assumption that the Senate
would serve as a council of advisors [to] the President, and second that the
supermajority requirement would protect regional interests, particularly those
of southern slaveholding states .... are now obsolete." Id. at 1276.
137. Tribe, supra note 19, at 1282.
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Due Process Clause and the Ninth and Fourteenth
Amendments, are the key to resolving the Tribe-
Ackerman/Golove impasse. The implications of this historical
approach to the constitutional political economy of the Treaty
Clause-including the possibility that NAFTA may indeed be
unconstitutional-will be explored in Part IV.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE WORLD
WAR II
Changes in the governance of the international political
economy since World War II necessarily cast a long shadow
over the constitutional debate regarding the congressional-
executive agreements that are constitutive of it.
Unmentioned in the work of Tribe, Ackerman, and Golove is a
view, prevalent among contemporary scholars of international
political economy, that a profound change in the architecture
of the world economy began during the turbulent period of the
1970s and has contributed significantly to drastic changes to
the international and domestic political economies. 3 '
Accordingly, this part will first focus on this shift in global
governance, or "global constitutionalism,"' 3 from "embedded
liberalism," the organizing principle of the initial post-World
War II and post-Great Depression "Golden Years,"14° to
"neoliberalism," the organizing principle of the world economy
during the current period of "globalization." A picture of two
very different phases of management of the international
political economy will emerge, each with distinct
consequences for domestic governments' ability to manage
their domestic economies and protect and enforce their
citizens' economic and social rights. The next part will then
turn to the relevance of this political-economic shift and its
implications for economic and social rights under the
138. See, e.g., MARK BLYTH, GREAT TRANSFORMATIONS: ECONOMIC IDEAS
AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2002); DAVID HARVEY, A
BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM (2006); EVELYNE HUBER & JOHN D.
STEPHENS, DEVELOPMENT AND CRISIS OF THE WELFARE STATE: PARTIES AND
POLICIES IN GLOBAL MARKETS (2001); ALAIN LIPIETZ, TOWARDS A NEW
ECONOMIC ORDER: POST-FORDISM, ECOLOGY AND DEMOCRACY (Malcom Slater
trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1992) (1989); RONEN PALAN, ET AL., STATE
STRATEGIES IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (1999).
139. See Gill, supra note 32, at 413.
140. Robert Reich has recently suggested this period might better be referred
to as "The Not Quite Golden Age." REICH, supra note 37, at 15.
744 [Vol:49
2009] CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
Constitution. From this analysis will emerge the contours of
a "constitutional political economy" capable of shedding new
light on whether NAFTA-style free trade agreements might
have a claim to relaxed constitutional procedures that evade
the Treaty Clause's supermajority requirement.
A. Embedded Liberalism: The International Political
Economy of the Postwar "Golden Years"
Writing in Foreign Affairs in 1947, Jacob Viner declared
that "[t]here are few free traders in the present-day world, no
one pays attention to their views, and no person in authority
anywhere advocates free trade.""' By the 1990s, this state of
affairs had been turned on its head. In 1992, candidate Bill
Clinton spent considerable time during his first campaign for
President of the United States lecturing labor unions and
others on the benefits, or at least the inevitability, of free
trade. 142 Once in office, Clinton oversaw the establishment of
the WTO and the passage of NAFTA during his first term,
and in his second term granted "permanent normal trade
relations"--or, in the traditional international trade argot,
permanent "most-favored nation" trading status-with China,
despite its record of serious abuses of labor rights and other
human rights.
Two decades earlier, as New Right leaders such as
Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher were putting the final
nails in its coffin, John Gerard Ruggie, drawing on the work
of Karl Polanyi,'11 coined the term "embedded liberalism" to
141. John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change:
Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 INT'L ORG. 379, 396
(1982) (quoting Jacob Viner, Conflicts of Principle in Drafting a Trade Charter,
25 FOREIGN AFF. 612, 613 (1947)).
142. See generally JOHN R. MACARTHUR, THE SELLING OF "FREE TRADE":
NAFTA, WASHINGTON, AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Univ.
of California Press 2001) (2000).
143. Ruggie, supra note 141, at 385 ("Karl Polanyi's magisterial work, The
Great Transformation, . . . developed a distinction between 'embedded' and
'disembedded' economic orders: 'normally, the economic order is merely a
function of the social, in which it is contained. Under neither tribal, nor feudal,
nor mercantile conditions was there, as we have shown, a separate economic
system in society. Nineteenth century society, in which economic activity was
isolated and imputed to a distinctive economic motive, was, indeed, a singular
departure.' The best known international forms taken by this 'singular
departure' were, of course, the regimes of free trade and the gold standard."
(quoting KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL ORIGINS OF OUR TIMES 71 (1944)) (also citing TRADE AND MARKETS IN
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describe the animating principle of the international political
economy of the initial post-World War II period.114 Ruggie's
term sought to capture this period's careful balance between a
general inclination toward freer-and especially
nondiscriminatory-trade against an interest in maintaining
the ability of national governments to intervene in the
domestic economy to provide domestic "public goods," and
thus political stability and legitimacy. In recent years,
Ruggie's account of embedded liberalism has enjoyed a
resurgence of interest from legal scholars. 145
Understanding the context of the Bretton Woods system
that undergirded the international political economy of
embedded liberalism is essential to understanding the shift
from embedded liberalism to neoliberalism. Embedded
liberalism emerged in the wake of the self-destruction of the
free trade system of the 1920s and the economic
protectionism and isolationism in the 1930s-and the
subsequent world war. The architects of the postwar order at
the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 (led by Harry Dexter
White of the United States and John Maynard Keynes of the
United Kingdom) sought to address the shortcomings of both
the 1930s and the 1920s: "unlike the economic nationalism of
the thirties, it would be multilateral in character; unlike the
liberalism of the gold standard and free trade, its
multilateralism would be predicated upon domestic
interventionism.' 46  Thus, Bretton Woods ushered in a
system rejecting extreme isolationism and economic
nationalism while supporting multilateralism and domestic
stability.
To achieve this balancing act, the negotiators at Bretton
Woods ensured that the compromise of embedded liberalism
also addressed the "dilemma between internal and external
stability."'47 To resolve this dilemma, both White and Keynes
brought to Bretton Woods proposals for "intergovernmental
collaboration to facilitate balance-of-payments equilibrium, in
THE EARLY EMPIRES (Karl Polanyi et al. eds., 1957))).
144. See generally Ruggie, supra note 141.
145. See Andrew Lang, Reconstructing Embedded Liberalism: John Gerhard
Ruggie and Constructivist Approaches to the Study of the International Trade
Regime, 9 J. INT'L EcON. L. 81, 81-82 (2006) (listing recent legal articles
discussing embedded liberalism).
146. Ruggie, supra note 141, at 393.
147. Id. at 394.
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an international environment of multilateralism and a
domestic context of full employment." 14' The outcome was the
embedded liberalism compromise, which represented,
according to Ruggie, the fusion of "power and legitimate social
purpose" in the international political economy. 4 9 In the
postwar international institutions that emerged, "the
principles of multilateralism and tariff reductions were
affirmed, but so were safeguards, exemptions, exceptions, and
restrictions-all designed to protect the balance of payments
and a variety of domestic social policies." 150 While there was
some intransigence on the part of certain elements in
Congress, as evidenced by the refusal to ratify the
International Trade Organization ("ITO"), in "the more
traditional subjects of commercial policy, the conjunction of
multilateralism and safeguarding domestic stability that had
evolved over the course of the ITO negotiations remained
intact. 15'
Under the ITO's successor, the GATT, Ruggie shows that
during the Bretton Woods era the hallmark of
multilateralism in trade was the principle of
nondiscrimination, not zero-tariffs. This principle was
codified in the GATT's most-favored-nation ("MFN") rule,
under which a country must treat the products of any country
party to the agreement the same as those of any other
"contracting party."'52 The GATT also generally prohibited
quantitative restrictions (i.e., quotas), though they "Were
deemed suitable measures for safeguarding the balance of
payments-explicitly including payments difficulties that
resulted from domestic policies designed to secure full
employment."'53 There were a variety of other exceptions,
including those for "emergency actions," escape clauses, and
agricultural trade, so long as they were used to facilitate a
domestic price-support program.14
In light of the many exceptions built into the postwar
trading regime, Ruggie concludes, "multilateralism and the
148. Id. at 394-95.
149. Id. at 382.
150. Id. at 396.
151. Id.
152. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 30, pt.1, art. I.
153. Ruggie, supra note 141, at 397.
154. Id.
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quest for domestic stability were coupled and even
conditioned by one another[; they] reflected the shared
legitimacy of a set of social objectives to which the industrial
world had moved, unevenly but 'as a single entity.' ""I
Consequently, the tendency, especially pronounced in
contemporary economics and law and economics literature on
international trade, "to view the postwar regimes as liberal
regimes, but with lots of cheating taking place on the
domestic side, fails to capture the full complexity of the
embedded liberalism compromise."156
Intrinsically related to the consensus on trade embodied
in the embedded liberalism compromise, and perhaps
essential to its functioning, was a new system for regulating
international financial flows. Under the Bretton Woods
system, the dollar, backed by gold, served as the world
reserve currency to which all other currencies were pegged,
thus ensuring a stable international financial system and a
"cushion [for] the domestic economy against the strictures of
the balance of payments."1"7  This new institutional design
had several elements:
Free exchanges would be assured by the abolition of all
forms of exchange controls and restrictions on current
transactions. Stable exchanges would be secured by
setting and maintaining official par values, expressed in
terms of gold. The "double screen" would consist of short-
term assistance to financial payments deficits on current
account, provided by an International Monetary Fund,
and, so as to correct "fundamental disequilibrium," the
ability to change exchange rates with Fund concurrence.
Governments would be permitted to maintain capital
155. Id. at 398.
156. Id. In a recent "preliminary work" that posits three globalizations of
legal thought, Duncan Kennedy has provided a useful way of understanding
this period as the overlap of the globalization of "The Social" from 1900 until
1968 and the globalization of the rights-oriented universalism of 1945 until
2000. Through the lens of Kennedy's typology, it was not until the demise of
embedded liberalism and the rise of neoliberalism that the "international
business community" eventually came to transform "property ownership into a
minoritarian identity and government regulation into the analog of
discrimination by legislative majorities," within the context of a globalizing
project of rights-oriented universalism. Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations
of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-2000, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAIsAL 19, 21, 67 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro
Santos eds., 2006).
157. Ruggie, supra note 141, at 395.
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controls. 158
The combination of capital controls and stable exchange rates
provided national governments the latitude to promote
multilateral trade within a context of relative international
financial stability, allowing intervention as necessary to
provide for social stability.
The design of the international monetary system created
at Bretton Woods took into account what political economists
often refer to as the "trilemma" or "irreconcilable trinity"'159 of
international monetary policy. As Robert Gilpin puts it:
Nations may want stable exchange rates to reduce
economic uncertainty, but they may also desire
discretionary monetary policy in order to promote
economic growth and steer their economies between
recession and inflation. In addition, governments may
want freedom of capital movements to facilitate the
conduct of trade, foreign investment, and other
international business activities. 160
While each of these three objectives may seem desirable,
"[u]nfortunately, no international monetary or financial
system can accommodate all three of these desirable goals
(fixed exchange rates, national independence in monetary
policy and capital mobility)." 61 The Bretton Woods system
chose fixed exchange rates and national independence, a
combination that "promotes economic stability and enables a
government to deal with unemployment," but at the cost of
freedom in the movement of capital.'62 This choice was an
essential backdrop to the new consensus on trade, and
perhaps even more important, it provided domestic economies
the insulation from the vagaries of the international economy
necessary to pursue the domestic social protection at the
heart of embedded liberalism's "fusion of power and
legitimate social purpose. '"163
Importantly, when it came time for the United States to
158. Id.
159. See ROBERT GILPIN, GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: UNDERSTANDING THE
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 248 (2001); see also Dani Rodrik, How Far
Will International Economic Integration Go?, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 177, 180-81
fig.2 (2000).
160. GILPIN, supra note 159, at 248-49.
161. Id. at 249.
162. Id.
163. Ruggie, supra note 141, at 385.
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enact the agreements codifying the embedded liberalism
compromise, President Harry Truman presented the Bretton
Woods Agreement to both houses of Congress as a
congressional-executive agreement.164 At the time, this form
was unusual, but, as noted in Part I.B, the overwhelming
majority of international agreements in the second half of the
twentieth century would come to take the congressional-
executive agreement form. Truman did not seek to make the
Treaty Clause irrelevant, however, as he simultaneously
presented the United Nations Charter 16 -which included the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR")1 66-as a
treaty, requiring a two-thirds majority in the Senate.167
Looking to the content of both agreements through the lens of
international political economy provides a way to make sense
of this period's loosening of the constitutional requirements
spelled out in the Treaty Clause: Truman's evasion of the
Treaty Clause for Bretton Woods acknowledged the need for
flexibility in the regulation of international commerce
because such arrangements have such a profound impact on
the government's capacity for domestic intervention. Before
the government can act to protect or enforce, for example, a
human right, it must be sure that international financial
markets will not deal it a grevious economic injury for doing
so. Presenting the U.N. Charter as a treaty emphasized that
the purpose of this new flexibility was to provide a stable and
peaceful international environment for commerce and the
protection of human rights-including the various economic
and social rights found in the UDHR. 168
This new commitment to economic and social rights was
perhaps best captured by President Franklin Roosevelt's
"Second Bill of Rights," which he announced in his Message to
Congress on the State of the Union given on January 11,
1944, when he declared,
In our day these economic truths have become accepted as
self-evident. We have accepted, so to speak, a second Bill
164. Tribe, supra note 19, at 1283.
165. Id. The U.N. Charter may be viewed at
http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/.
166. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc
A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration of Human Rights].
167. Tribe, supra note 19, at 1283. See generally U.S. CONST. art. II § 2, cl.2.
168. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights supra note 166, arts. 22-27.
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of Rights under which a new basis of security and
prosperity can be established for all-regardless of station,
race, or creed.
Among these are:
The right to a useful and remunerative job in the
industries or shops or farms or mines of the nation;
The right to earn enough to provide adequate food and
clothing and recreation;
The right of every farmer to raise and sell his products at
a return which will give him and his family a decent
living;
The right of every businessman, large and small, to trade
in an atmosphere of freedom from unfair competition and
domination by monopolies at home or abroad;
The right of every family to a decent home;
The right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to
achieve and enjoy good health;
The right to adequate protection from the economic fears
of old age, sickness, accident, and unemployment;
The right to a good education.
All of these rights spell security. And after this war is
won we must be prepared to move forward, in the
implementation of these rights, to new goals of human
happiness and well-being.
America's own rightful place in the world depends in large
part upon how fully these and similar rights have been
carried into practice for our citizens.169
Less than a year later, Roosevelt was reelected to an
unprecedented fourth term. Parts III and IV.A will
demonstrate that Truman's approach to the approval of
Bretton Woods and the U.N. Charter represented the
fulfillment of a constitutional imperative resulting from the
New Deal's constitutional revolution and its commitment to
economic and social rights. First, however, it is necessary to
turn to the story of neoliberal globalization, which represents
169. Franklin D. Rooselvelt, President of the United States, Message to
Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 11, 1944), reprinted in SUNSTEIN,
supra note 28, at 235, 242-43.
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the betrayal of this commitment in recent decades.
B. Neoliberalism: The International Political Economy of
"Globalization"
Although it is difficult to identify precisely the moment
when the project of embedded liberalism was no more, most
would agree it was finished by the time of the electoral
victories of New Right leaders such as Margaret Thatcher in
1979 and Ronald Reagan in 1980. These victories, however,
were many years in the making.
Indeed, more fundamentally, the triumph of the New
Right and neoliberalism represents the ultimate resolution
(or attempted resolution) of the ongoing crisis in the
international political economy during the late 1960s and
1970s. The turbulent events of this period drew into doubt
the continuing viability of the embedded liberalism
compromise. First, the simultaneous costs of the Viet Nam
War and President Lyndon Johnson's nascent Great Society
programs forced the United States to borrow heavily, which,
through the Bretton Woods system of pegging other
currencies to the dollar, passed on inflationary pressures to
other countries and thus compromised the leadership role of
the United States in the international financial order. 170
After the collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary system and
the formal adoption of floating exchange rates in 1973, the
United States, Europe, and the rest of the world faced the
reemergence of an unregulated international financial system
and its attendant instability. 171
The end of the Bretton Woods monetary regime was one
of many systemic shocks affecting the United States and
international political economies in the 1970s. The
170. PALAN, supra note 138, at 134.
171. The so-called "Eurodollar" market has exploded in the wake of the
collapse of the Bretton Woods system. This market, already firmly established
by 1973, initially emerged from the response of boutique investment houses in
the city of London stockpiling dollars for South American investments in the
wake of the United States' decision to use its role in the Bretton Woods system
to punish Britain for its role in the Suez Crisis by pressuring the Pound
Sterling. See RONEN PALAN, THE OFFSHORE WORLD: SOVEREIGN MARKETS,
VIRTUAL PLACES AND NOMAD MILLIONAIRES 26--32 (2003) (detailing the history
of the emergence of the Eurodollar market and noting its significant
contribution to the "serious problem" of "the volatility of a largely unregulated
global financial market of such magnitude, and its concomitant capacity to
subvert policy aims of even the largest states").
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Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries' oil embargo,
launched in the wake of the Yom Kippur War in 1973, put
tremendous pressure on the economies of oil-importing
countries, including the United States.17 2 At the same time,
new "efficiencies" realized by "lean production" techniques
first pioneered in Japan and advances in supply-chain
management put increasing pressure on the primary forms of
industrial organization in the United States and Western
countries more generally. 17 3
Meanwhile, the postwar political coalitions that had
supported the embedded liberalism compromise began to
break down, especially on the left. The events of 1968-
including May's student strike in France and August's
protests at the Democratic Party's nominating convention in
Chicago-came to symbolize this political fragmentation in
the most economically developed countries. 17 4 Major events
elsewhere in the world, such as the October massacre of
students at Tlatelolco in Mexico City just before the start of
the 1968 Summer Olympics, still reverberate to this day.17
In the United States, the progress of Johnson's Great Society,
already facing a budgetary environment groaning under the
spiraling costs of the Viet Nam War in the wake of
accumulating military setbacks following the Tet Offensive,'76
came to a halt with the triumph of Richard Nixon, thanks in
significant part to his racially charged "southern strategy," in
the 1968 election. 177
Initially, there was no consensus at the international
level or within the United States about how to react as this
172. See HARVEY, supra note 138, at 27.
173. See John Tomaney, A New Paradigm of Work Organization and
Technology?, in POST-FORDISM: A READER, supra note 60, at 157, 164-70
(surveying arguments about the "Japanization" of production and concluding
that it constitutes a significant "form of work intensification").
174. Sean O'Hagan, Everyone to the Barricades, THE OBSERVER (England),
Jan. 20, 2008, at 4, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/j an/20/1968theyearofrevolt.features.
175. See Reed Johnson, Putting a Spotlight on the Massacre of 1968 in Mexico
City, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2008, at El.
176. See GEORGE C. HERRING, AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR: THE UNITED
STATES AND VIETNAM, 1950-1975, at 245 (4th ed. 2001).
177. See PAUL BREST, ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 505 (4th ed. 2000). Part II.C will
discuss the special significance of race in thwarting efforts to expand economic
and social rights since the 1930s.
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"perfect storm" continued to batter the international political
economy. The Third World countries composing the Non-
Aligned Movement, however, proposed a solution at their
Algiers summit in the fall of 1973 when they tabled a
proposal for a New International Economic Order ("NIEO"). 178
This proposal, which grew out of discussions at the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, included
proposals to address challenges particular to Third World
countries but also included a demand for the "recognition of
the rights pertaining to economic sovereignty of states,
particularly with regard to nationalization and the control of
the activities of multinational companies."17 9  Stephen
Krasner argues the NIEO was an attempt by Third World
countries to change the "existing goals and institutional
structures" of the international economic system,' ° and in the
end, the NIEO gained little traction.'8 Some scholars even
argue it provided a negative reference point for what would
become the neoliberal backlash against embedded
liberalism. 8 2
Simultaneously, the set of ideas that would eventually
carry the day had been fermenting for several decades outside
of the mainstream policy discourse at institutions such as the
University of Chicago. Since the end of World War II,
scholars such as Milton Friedman and Friedrich von Hayek
(some of the "few free traders in the present-day world" to
whom Viner referred in 1947) had developed their ideas8 3 in
relative obscurity.' Beginning in the 1970s, however, their
178. GRAHAM EVANS & JEFFREY NEWNHAM, THE PENGUIN DICTIONARY OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 368 (1998).
179. Id.
180. STEPHEN D. KRASNER, STRUCTURAL CONFLICT: THE THIRD WORLD
AGAINST GLOBAL LIBERALISM 13-18, 15 (1985).
181. JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 16, at 1194.
182. See Kees van der Pijl, A Lockean Europe?, 37 NEW LEFT REV. 9, 24
(2006) ("The response to the movement for social and economic democracy then
produced the 'opposite thesis', namely that 'rationally organized' capitalism is
possible only as the restriction of democracy. It was this restricted democracy
that initially enabled the neoliberal turn . . . ."); see also KEES VAN DER PIJL,
GLOBAL RIVALRIES FROM THE COLD WAR TO IRAQ 122-32 (2006).
183. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM &
FREEDOM (1962); FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944).
184. See YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF
PALACE WARS: LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN
AMERICAN STATES 74, 81 (2002) (noting that, while "the sixties witnessed a
tremendous growth in the education of economists and the official consecration
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counter-project began to draw increasing interest from those
concerned with what some called the "crisis of democracy" 185
and others referred to as "the fiscal crisis of the state."18 6 A
number of "think tanks" and foundations (for example, the
Hoover Institution, the American Enterprise Institute, the
Heritage Foundation, the Cato Institute, and the Olin
Foundation) emerged to support academics and activists who
sought to promote a new free market orthodoxy. 8 7  Their
success has been phenomenal, particularly in the field of law.
For example, by the time the Olin Foundation spent the last
of its funds, as planned, and closed its doors in 2005, it had
disbursed nearly $400 million.' 8  The New York Times
opened its piece reporting on Olin's closing thusly:
Without it, the Federalist Society might not exist, nor its
network of 35,000 conservative lawyers. Economic
analysis might hold less sway in American courts. The
premier idea factories of the right, from the Hoover
Institution to the Heritage Foundation, would have lost
millions of dollars in core support. And some classics of
the conservative canon would have lost their financier,
including Allan Bloom's lament of academic decline and
Charles Murray's attacks on welfare. 8
9
One could make similar comments about numerous other
right-leaning foundations and think tanks with ongoing
operations.
of Keynesian doctrines along with the triumph of mathematical techniques-
notably, in the elite institutions of the Ivy League," an effective promotional
strategy for the University of Chicago's so-called "fresh-water economics,"
combined with "[tihe return of inflation and budgetary deficits, exacerbated by
the expenses of the Vietnam War, underscored the limits of Keynesian
regulation. The portrait of Friedman on the cover of Time Magazine in 1969
(and the cover of the New York Times Magazine in 1970) attests to the success
of the strategy of vulgarization-made also in strict alliance with the financial
milieu, which had never accepted Keynesian doctrine" (citations omitted)).
185. See MICHEL CROZIER, SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON & JOJI WATANUKI, THE
CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY: REPORT ON THE GOvERNABILITY OF DEMOCRACIES TO
THE TRILATERAL COMMISSION, 13, 164 (1975) quoted in GARY TEEPLE,
GLOBALIZATION AND THE DECLINE OF SOCIAL REFORM 124 (1995) (decrying the
realization of "too much democracy" that had resulted in an "overload on
government," financial and otherwise, and that required the limiting of social
expectations and, ultimately, social outcomes).
186. See JAMES O'CONNOR, THE FISCAL CRISIS OF THE STATE (1973).
187. DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 184, at 128-29.
188. Jason DeParle, Goals Reached, Donor on Right Closes Up Shop, N.Y.
TIMES, May 29, 2005, at Al.
189. Id.
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Future Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell's April 1971
memorandum to the United States Chamber of Commerce
provides an illustration of how the neoliberal project
developed from academic ideas into a pro-free-market
"common sense" and government policies. In his memo,
Powell called for "the wisdom, ingenuity and resources of
American business to be marshaled against those who would
destroy it," noting that "[sltrength lies in organization, in
careful long-term planning and implementation, in
consistency of action over an indefinite period of years, in the
scale of financing available only through joint effort, and in
the political power available only through united action and
national organizations." 190 By the end of the 1970s, American
business had indeed marshaled its wisdom, ingenuity, and
resources to promote what Sol Picciotto calls a "minimalist" or
"market-friendly state"'9' and what much of the world knows
simply as "neoliberalism.''"
Neoliberalism, as David Harvey explains, find expression
in policies such as "[d]eregulation, privatization, and
withdrawal of the state from many areas of social
provision."193 In Harvey's words, "[n]eoliberalism is in the
first instance a theory of political-economic practices that
proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by
liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills
within an institutional framework characterized by strong
private property rights, free markets, and free trade."194 This
ideology of "freedom" focused especially on the freedoms and
rights of the investors who had seen their activities
significantly curtailed under embedded liberalism in the
service of the New Deal macroeconomic model, social
stability, and institutional legitimacy.
With business support and eventually the backing of the
United States government, neoliberalism has taken hold as
the organizing principle of the international political economy
since the 1970s. International agreements have increasingly
190. HARVEY, supra note 138, at 43.
191. Picciotto, supra note 46, at 4.
192. See generally HARVEY, supra note 138.
193. Id. at 3.
194. Id. at 2. Margaret Thatcher, whose government cemented the triumph
of neoliberalism in the United Kingdom, famously remarked, "there is no such
thing as society: there are individual men and women and there are families."
Id. at 23.
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emphasized orthodox liberalism at the expense of social
"embeddedness" by limiting governments' freedom to
intervene in markets. These agreements have sought to
impose market discipline progressively in areas in which
state intervention to ensure social protection and stability
was thought to be essential after the Great Depression and
World War II. Notably, the new international political
economy of neoliberalism has advanced free trade of
significantly expanded scope in the absence of meaningful
labor, social, and environmental protections, 195 and the free
movement of capital without concern for the concomitant and
predictable limiting of the capacities of domestic governments
for domestic intervention. 196
Although countries have adopted a number of different
individualized strategies for coping with the era of the
"competition state" ushered in by neoliberalism, even those
most concerned with preserving social democracy and the
welfare state, such as the Scandinavian countries, have made
concessions to the pressures of neoliberalism's global market
forces.' 97 As the late Susan Strange put it, deliberate policy
choices and key "non-decisions" have created a "casino
economy" characterized by high volatility, outsized gains for a
select few, and little concern for aims such as social
protection, equality, or stability. 198  In this way, the
emergence of neoliberalism and the international political-
economic architecture supporting it have seemingly made
obsolete the social concerns-and thus the legitimation
concerns-at the core of embedded liberalism. As Stephen
Gill notes, the "new constitutionalism" of neoliberalism is a
project which privileges the rights of investors over all others,
195. See generally Chantal Thomas, Should the World Trade Organization
Incorporate Labor and Environmental Standards?, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 347,
390 (2004) (noting the lack of effective labor and environmental protections
under the World Trade Organization agreements).
196. See supra notes 159-62 and accompanying text (discussing the trilemma
of international monetary policy).
197. PALAN supra note 138, at 119 ("It is clear then that the shielders'
strategy has been under attack in recent years. However, the fact [that the
welfare state] has survived bears testimony to the desire by large swathes of
voters, public servants and other interest groups to maintain a form of
integration with the world economy that protects and shields society from the
more harmful effects of market forces.").
198. SUSAN STRANGE, MAD MONEY: WHEN MARKETS OUTGROW
GOVERNMENTS 4-7 (1998); see also SUSAN STRANGE, CASINO CAPITALISM (1986).
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in contrast to "traditional notions of constitutionalism," which
"are associated with political rights, obligations, and
freedoms, and procedures that give institutional form to the
state."199  As the next sections will show, this new global
constitutionalism runs afoul of the United States
Constitution. But first, it is necessary to examine the
constitutional history of the New Deal period.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
A. The Constitutional Revolution of 1937 as a
"Constitutional Moment"
Like Thomas, Forbath argues that political economy may
intersect with constitutional law to the extent that we must
consider "constitutional political economy.,,00 The
indeterminate nature of what the text of the Constitution has
to say about political economy was at the center of the
constitutional revolution of 1937, when the Supreme Court
sharply reversed its previous course and began upholding the
constitutionality of New Deal programs similar to ones it had
been striking down during Roosevelt's first term. In the
words of orthodox economic liberalism's most ardent
advocates among contemporary legal thinkers, this reversal
resulted in the "exile" of their preferred reading of the
Constitution.2 10 This conception of constitutional liberty was
at its peak from the Gilded Age through the 1920s, and it was
exemplified by "substantive due process" cases such as
Lochner v. New York, which struck down a New York law
setting a maximum of sixty hours per week or ten hours per
day for bakers to prevent a debilitating ailment known as
199. Gill, supra note 32, at 413.
200. See Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, supra note 26, at 41;
Forbath, New Deal Constitution in Exile, supra note 26, at 222. A much
narrower conception of constitutional political economy has been put forward by
scholars working in the fields of rational-choice theory and law and economics.
See, e.g., GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE REASON OF RULES:
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (Liberty Fund, Inc. 2000) (1985);
ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION (2002).
201. Jeffrey Rosen, The Unregulated Offensive, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2005, § 6
(Magazine), at 42 (using Judge Douglas Ginsburg's reference to the
"Constitution in Exile" to describe the movement of those advocating a return to
pre-1937 view of economic liberty and limitations on the power of the
government to engage in economic and social regulation).
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"baker's lung." 202 The Court found that this public health
measure violated the liberty interest of bakers to contract to
work more hours.2 °3 In dissent, Justice Holmes retorted that
"[tihe Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert
Spencer's Social Statics."20 4  During the Lochner era, the
Supreme Court used its laissez-faire conception of substantive
due process and economic liberty to strike down myriad
economic and social regulations, including numerous New
Deal programs, a practice Justice Clarence Thomas seemed to
suggest resuming in a 1995 concurring opinion.20 5
Cass Sunstein describes the momentous shift in
constitutional political economy occurring in 1937 as a
resetting of the "common law baseline" away from the
"status-quo neutrality" of the Lochner era, which refused to
inquire into the preexisting distribution of wealth and
entitlements in society that necessarily serves as the
background to the operation of the legal system and
constitutional order.2 6 To illustrate the contingency of this
common law baseline, Sunstein contrasts the Supreme
Court's view of minimum wage laws in two cases, one pre-
and one post-1937. In 1924, the Court, in Adkins v. Childrens
Hospital, found that "[tlo the extent that the sum fixed [by a
minimum wage statute] exceeds the fair value of the services
rendered, it amounts to a compulsory exaction from the
employer for the support of a partially indigent person, for
whose condition there rests upon him no particular
responsibility."2 7 After 1937, the Court revisited this issue in
West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, finding that, if allowed by the
government, "[the exploitation of a class of workers who are
in an unequal position with respect to bargaining power... is
in effect a subsidy for unconscionable employers."20 ' As
Sunstein notes, these cases demonstrate that "[tihe notion of
subsidy is of course incoherent without a baseline from which
202. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
203. Id. at 64-65.
204. Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
205. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 599 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Court's "wrong turn" was its departure in the
1930s from precedent in overturning cases such as Lochner).
206. Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 874, 888
(1987).
207. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 557-58 (1923).
208. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937).
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to make a measurement."20 9 It is the setting of this baseline
with which constitutional political economy is primarily
concerned, and 1937 witnessed as radical a resetting of this
baseline as there has been at any point in American
constitutional history.
The principal challenge that this resetting of the baseline
in 1937 presents for constitutional law is one of legitimacy:
how can this fundamental shift in constitutional political
economy, occurring in the context of Roosevelt's threatened
"court-packing" plan, be understood as anything but the
exercise of raw politics? Ackerman responds by putting
forward a theory of constitutional amendment outside of the
formal amendment process of Article V, arguing that the post-
1937 expansion of federal power was justified by a
"constitutional moment," a deliberative democratic process
culminating in Roosevelt's sweeping reelection victory in
1936. According to Ackerman, "We the People" practiced
"higher lawmaking" outside the rules of the formal
amendment process, enacting a constitutional revolution as
profound as those seen at the Philadelphia Constitutional
Convention (the Articles of Confederation did not provide for
a constitutional convention) and Reconstruction
(extraordinary steps were taken to prevent southern states
from blocking the Reconstruction amendments).210
Ackerman somewhat narrowly defines his project as
aimed at refuting the reigning "professional narrative" which
viewed 1937 as merely a restoration of Chief Justice John
Marshall's view of the proper role of the Court.211 Instead,
Ackerman's theory of a "dualist constitution" posits that there
are two different types of decisions that can be made in a
democracy: "[tihe first is a decision by the American People;
the second, by their government." 12 The latter are regular
occurrences, but the former require that a political movement
gain "the authority to enact its proposals into the nation's
209. Sunstein, supra note 206, at 876.
210. See generally ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 25.
211. Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, supra note 25, at
457-58 (explaining that, in this narrative, "the period between Reconstruction
and New Deal can then be viewed as a (complex) story about the fall from
grace.... Only Justice Roberts' 'switch in time,' and the departure of the worst
judicial offenders, permitted the Court to expiate its countermajoritarian sins
without permanent institutional damage.").
212. Id. at 461.
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higher law.""
The process by which a political movement obtains this
"higher lawmaking" authority consists of three steps:
[Flirst, convince an extraordinary number of its fellow
citizens to take its proposed initiative with a seriousness
that they do not normally accord to politics; second, allow
opponents a fair opportunity to organize their own forces;
third, convince a majority of Americans to support
transformative initiatives as their merits are discussed,
time and again, in the deliberative fora provided by the
dualist constitutional order for this purpose. It is only
those initiatives that survive this especially onerous
higher lawmaking system that earn the special kind of
legitimacy the dualist accords to decisions made by the
People.214
From this perspective, Roosevelt's reelection in 1936, after
four years of proposing New Deal policies, provided the higher
lawmaking mandate to amend the Constitution to allow for
national economic and social regulation because Roosevelt
constantly talked about the stakes of the changes he was first
proposing, and then implementing, as he repeatedly won
elections by huge margins.215 Ackerman's schema for the
process by which Roosevelt's constitutional politics, which
culminated in his first reelection in 1936, and his threatened
court-packing plan, effected the constitutional change is the
following: "Constitutional Impasse 4 Electoral Mandate -
Challenge to Dissenting Institutions 4 Switch in Time -4
Consolidating Election."21 6
For all of the hard work and constitutional deliberation,
however, Ackerman does not give as much constitutional
ground as he could (or should) to Roosevelt and the citizens
who gave him his mandate to engage in "higher lawmaking":
Ackerman only asserts that the New Deal's non-Article V
constitutional amendment allowed for national economic and
social regulation.2 7  Forbath rightly takes issue with
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, supra note 26, at 67.
216. ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 25, at 20.
217. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, supra note 26, at 6 ("[T]he
New Deal moment . . . gained 'constitutional legitimation' for the welfare state.
But did it require it-by producing a redefinition of national citizenship?
Throughout his long and detailed discussions of the New Deal moment,
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Ackerman on this count, arguing that the New Deal's
constitutional moment also required the "recognition of new
rights and new rights-bearers."21 8  Forbath notes that
Roosevelt and his followers in Congress repeatedly won both
presidential and congressional elections campaigning on an
expansive platform that eventually included the Second Bill
of Rights.219 Accordingly, it is appropriate to join Forbath in
moving beyond Ackerman to accept the proposition that the
1936 election and subsequent elections further amended the
Constitution, enshrining in it the economic and social rights
found in the Second Bill of Rights along with its orientation
toward the international political economy, the embedded
liberalism compromise. 220 Like the Founding and
Reconstruction, "the New Deal marked a 'constitutional
moment,' a sustained, self-conscious political act by the
citizenry that [overthrew] one constitutional regime and
[ushered] in a new one,' 221 as the Lochner Court's enactment
of "Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics ' 222 was superseded by
the New Deal Constitution's vision of social citizenship and
embrace of economic and social rights.223
Forbath's insight that the New Deal's constitutional
moment necessarily must have encompassed both the
constitutional legitimation of the expansive administrative
state and recognition under the Constitution of "social
citizenship" helpfully recasts the question of the
constitutionality of national economic and social regulation
through the expansive administrative state and related
questions of international governance.224 In the 1960s, legal
scholars such as Frank Michelman used moral philosophy to
locate economic and social rights in the Constitution.225 With
Ackerman studiously avoids the question, remaining silent and seemingly
uncertain about this central issue.") (footnote omitted).
218. Id. at 67.
219. See id. at 73-75.
220. Id. at 72.
221. Id. at 64.
222. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
223. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, supra note 26, at 1, 67.
224. Id. at 1.
225. Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreward: On
Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7,
14-16 (1969) (advocating a reading of the Constitutional as protecting Rawlsian
"just wants" through the Due Process Clause and noting the limitations of the
Equal Protection Clause for protecting "just wants").
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the rise of neoliberalism, their approach achieved little
traction in the courts, Congress, or the general populace.
26
Consequently, Forbath's focus on history seems much more
promising (in addition to being at least as convincing):
instead of an esoteric debate about first principles of moral
philosophy and the permissible scope of federal power, setting
a baseline of fundamental rights in the economic and social
realm becomes a question of the people's role in interpreting
the Constitution and restructuring the state in the wake of
the unsurpassed crisis of the Great Depression.
In showing that "Ackerman is wrong ... in suggesting
that the New Deal's 'constitutional mandate' amounted
simply to an authorization for expanded federal power and an
activist national government,"2 27 Forbath demonstrates that
the mandate also entailed the recognition and enforcement of
economic and social rights of the sort set forth in the Second
Bill of Rights and the UDHR.228 While Forbath has not yet
discussed his view of the implications of Ackerman's theory in
the realm of international political economy, it follows that
federal power should also have been expanded in the
international arena where a new international architecture
was necessary to support the domestic government's efforts to
support the "new rights" of the "new rights-bearers" that
emerged from the New Deal's constitutional revolution.
B. Locating Economic and Social Rights in the Constitution
The late Charles Black, in his final book, argued that the
failure to recognize that the Constitution itself already
contains provisions recognizing a full spectrum of economic
and social rights as expansive as Roosevelt's Second Bill of
Rights is "one of the most outrageous actions of our Supreme
Court."229 For Black,
[a] sound and satisfying foundation for a general and fully
national American law of human rights exists in three
imperishable commitments-the Declaration of
226. See Angela P. Harris, From Stonewall to the Suburbs?: Toward a
Political Economy of Sexuality, 14 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 1539, 1555-61
(2006).
227. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, supra note 26, at 64-65.
228. Id. at 69.
229. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HuMAN RIGHTS
NAMED & UNNAMED 87 (1999).
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Independence, the Ninth Amendment, and the
"citizenship" and "privileges and immunities" clauses of
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment (as those clauses
ought to have been and still ought to be interpreted).230
Such an approach, of course, would require reviving
constitutional provisions that have long lain dormant. For
example, for the courts to invest this type of meaning in the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment,231 the Supreme Court would have to overrule
The Slaughter-House Cases of 1873,232 a ruling that imposed
an extraordinarily narrow reading on this clause.233
To the argument that economic and social rights as
"positive rights" did not have obvious mechanisms for
enforcement,234 Forbath notes that advocates at the time of
the New Deal "responded first that legal invention [could]
develop new procedures and second that, in any case,
immediate judicial enforceability was not the right test of a
right."235  Consequently, the reformers' pragmatic vision had
230. Id. at xix (noting that the text of the Fourteenth Amendment actually
mentions "privileges or immunities").
231. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No state shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States.").
232. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
233. Id. at 79-80 (holding that the only "privileges or immunities" protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment are the rights to petition the government; freely
access the seaports, use of the courts and other government agencies of the
federal government; protection by the federal government of life, liberty, and
property when on the seas or abroad; peacefully assemble; petition the
government; the writ of habeas corpus; and use the country's navigable waters).
234. See MAURICE CRANSTON, WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS 37-38 (1962)
("[Tihere [is not] any difficulty about putting into effect such a principle as the
right to trial by jury. This is no longer the case when we turn to the 'right to
social security,' the 'right to work,' and the rest of the economic and social
rights. For a government to provide social security, it needs to do more than
make laws; it needs to have access to very great wealth."). See generally ISAIAH
BERLIN, TWO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY (1958) (outlining the distinction between
"negative" and "positive" liberty). But see HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS:
SUBSISTENCE AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 45 (1980) ("As in the cases of the
threats to physical security that we normally consider, the threat to subsistence
is human activity with largely predictable effects.... The design, building, and
maintenance of institutions and practices that protect people's subsistence
against the callous-and even the merely over-energetic-is no more and no less
positive than the conception and execution of programs to control violent crimes
against the person. . . . It is conceivable, although I doubt if anyone really
knows, that the two are more effectively and efficiently pursued together.
Neither looks simple, cheap, or 'negative.'") (citation omitted).
235. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, supra note 26, at 75
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room for both the political branches and the courts. Either
branch has the capacity to extend the range of "fundamental
rights" protected by the Constitution to include economic and
social rights in its own way.236 Typically, if recognized by the
courts, such a classification requires heightened scrutiny for
actions implicating these rights, and, if recognized by the
political branches, there would be a heightened duty on the
part of Congress and the President to protect and enforce
them through legislative and administrative action.
As one would expect, the judicial branch has the most
developed conceptual framework for dealing with
fundamental rights. As Black notes, however, "[t]he 'due
process' clause is being made to carry the load that would far
more naturally have been assigned to the 'privileges and
immunities' clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, jointly
with the two 'citizenship' clauses of that Amendment. 23 7
Accordingly, the Supreme Court's fundamental rights
jurisprudence has had to develop apart from Black's favored
textual vehicles. Regardless, and despite today's Supreme
Court's constricted jurisprudence, it is conceivable that
economic and social rights could be located in the Equal
Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, the Ninth
Amendment, or a reinvigorated Privileges and Immunities
Clause. Regardless of where the rights are located textually,
the crucial point would be the classification of such rights as
"fundamental rights" deserving of heightened scrutiny under
the Constitution.
The famous "footnote four" in the 1938 decision of United
States v. Carolene Products Co., a decision which set out a
broad interpretation of Congress's power to enact legislation
regulating interstate commerce (a key component of the
nationalization of the economy), provides the basis for
heightened constitutional scrutiny in cases where
fundamental rights are at stake, stating:
There may be a narrower scope for operation of the
presumption of constitutionality [under the Commerce
Clause] when legislation appears on its face to be within a
specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of
(internal quotation marks omitted).
236. See Part IV.C for a discussion of this proposition in light of the
Rehnquist Court's "new federalism" jurisprudence.
237. BLACK, supra note 229, at 93 (emphasis omitted).
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the first ten Amendments, which are deemed equally
specific when held to be embraced within the
Fourteenth.235
In Palko v. Connecticut, the Court outlined its general
approach to questions of fundamental rights by describing
such rights as those that "have been found to be implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty" and whose abolition would
"violate a 'principle of justice so rooted in the traditions [of]
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental.' "239 As Forbath has shown, after 1937 the
historical argument that the economic and social rights
enumerated in Roosevelt's Second Bill of Rights are "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty" and thus "to be ranked as
fundamental" is strong, regardless of which substantive
constitutional provision gives rise to them.240
C. The Continuing Exile of the New Deal Constitution
In contrast to those who lament the "exile" of the Lochner
Constitution, Forbath argues it is the New Deal Constitution
that lives in exile.241 Indeed, since Roosevelt first laid it out,
the promise the Second Bill of Rights might never have been
more distant than at present. This constitutionally troubling
state of affairs raises two questions. First, how did the New
Deal Constitution disappear from American constitutional
culture? Second, have subsequent events arising to the level
of a "constitutional moment" enacted a superceding neoliberal
constitution?
Forbath understands this betrayal of the social
citizenship vision of the New Deal as part of a longer history
of the undermining of the progressive potential of the
Constitution by the "the tangled knot of race and class" and
what W.E.B. DuBois called the "unending tragedy of
Reconstruction."242 Just as the founding fathers betrayed the
Declaration of Independence's statement that "[a]ll men are
created equal" by accepting slavery and Reconstruction
betrayed Lincoln's promise of "[a] new birth of freedom" by
ultimately bowing to Jim Crow, the New Deal's promise of a
238. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
239. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
240. Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
241. See generally Forbath, New Deal Constitution in Exile, supra note 26.
242. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, supra note 26, at 89.
766 [Vo1:49
2009] CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
redefinition of national citizenship enshrined in the Second
Bill of Rights was betrayed by the "southern veto. 243
Dixiecrats in Congress exercised their veto during the
New Deal period "Ib]y allying with northern Republicans, or
by threatening to do so," allowing them to strip "all the main
pieces of New Deal legislation of any design or provision that
threatened the separate southern labor market and its
distinctive melding of class and caste relations, its racial
segmentation, and its low wages."'2" As a result, major
framework statutes, such as the Social Security Act,
Agricultural Adjustment Act, National Recovery Act,
National Labor Relations Act, and Fair Labor Standards Act,
included carve-outs for significant portions of the labor force,
such as agricultural and domestic workers (the majority of
black laborers), or allowed excessive state-level autonomy in
implementation to protect what Forbath calls the southern
caste system. 245 Finally, with the start of World War II, the
Dixiecrats moved into open revolt against the New Deal,
joining with Republicans to block efforts to "complete the New
Deal" by enacting and implementing the Second Bill of
Rights.24 6
In place of the realization of the New Deal's promise of a
redefinition of national citizenship through the Second Bill of
Rights, certain workers in core sectors of the economy
secured, largely through their labor unions (and thanks in no
small part to the National Labor Relations Act), a private
system of job security and social provision similar to that
promised by the Second Bill of Rights.247 Unfortunately, this
private system never grew to include every worker, let alone
those out of work. Moreover, according to Forbath, even
during this brief period, many of the benefitted workers and
their leaders grew shortsighted and did not heed Martin
243. Id. at 76 (defining the "southern veto" as "the hammer lock on Congress
that the Southern Democrats enjoyed by dint of their numbers, their seniority,
and their control over key committees").
244. Id. at 76-77.
245. Id. at 77.
246. Id. at 78 (noting that with the outbreak of war, the Dixiecrats "joined
ranks with the minority-party Republicans to defeat those 1940s legislative
programs and structural innovations and institutional reforms in the executive
branch that looked toward 'completing the New Deal' by enacting and
implementing FDR's 'second Bill of Rights' ").
247. Id. at 85.
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Luther King, Jr.'s call for the excluded workers' realization of
"their New Deal thirty years late."248
Ultimately, the combination of the defeats of the 1940s
and the temporary victory of a limited "private welfare state"
held back progress toward the realization of the Second Bill of
Rights for all Americans and did much to end talk about
economic and social rights.2 49  As Forbath puts it, "[t]he
constitutional bad faith that for half a century enabled both
parties and all three branches of the federal government to
condone or support Jim Crow and disenfranchisement,
produced the anomaly of a reactionary core at the heart of
FDR's New Deal liberal coalition."25 ° As a result, "black
America never got its 'New Deal thirty years late.' Nor did
white working-class America get the New Deal Constitution it
was promised thirty years earlier."2 1
Forbath's account of the exiling of the New Deal
Constitution, however, focuses on the domestic political
economy instead of the international political economy. As
shown in Part II, while the domestic aspects of the New Deal
Constitution may have been exiled by the 1940s, the
international political economy of embedded liberalism
maintained an international architecture that would have
been supportive of efforts to implement the Second Bill of
Rights until the 1970s. Indeed, embedded liberalism's
international architecture arguably represented the
fulfillment of Article 28 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, which states that "[elveryone is entitled to a
social and international order in which the rights and
freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized." '252
Thus the international face of embedded liberalism lasted for
over thirty years as a "placeholder," providing a cushion in
case the domestic government ever wanted to act to realize
the promise of the New Deal Constitution. With the rise of
248. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, supra note 26, at 87-89
("[O]ther progressive labor leaders supported King's vision-but not the AFL-
CIO leadership under George Meaney's wing . . . [and even the progressive
rank-and-file], . . . as Meaney pointedly observed, [only] cared about the
pensions, health plans, and job security measures in their union contracts, [and]
not about raising hell until government provided these things for everyone.").
249. See id. at 89.
250. Id. at 85.
251. Id. at 89.
252. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 166, art. 28.
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international neoliberalism, however, the architecture of the
international political economy became exceedingly hostile to
attempts by domestic governments to protect and enforce
many of the economic and social rights guaranteed by the
UDHR253 and Roosevelt's Second Bill of Rights.254
In a compelling narrative, Angela Harris provides a wide-
ranging account of the rise of neoliberalism in the American
legal system that falls short of showing that neoliberalism
was in fact constitutionalized during the 1970s and 1980s.255
She argues that, despite its antidemocratic origins,
neoliberalism triumphed during the 1970s and 1980s as "[t]he
New Right, and neoliberalism more generally, successfully
drew upon preexisting institutional and intellectual resources
to craft a campaign that spoke, if not to the hearts and minds
of Americans, certainly to their fears and unarticulated
longings. 256  During this period, according to Harris, the
deployment of code words such as "crime" and "welfare"
(words infused with rich new racial meanings, thanks to the
Right's growing infrastructure capable of developing and
cultivating ideas from the level of academic discourse all the
way to the level of partisan spin 257) did much of the work of
swinging popular support behind neoliberal restructuring.2 8
This support for neoliberal policies, however, was not merely
rooted in "bigotry; it also spoke to the material and symbolic
interests and desires of a suburbanized America struggling
with global economic restructuring without the language to
name that restructuring as a political event, rather than a
natural disaster."259
Harris's account, while an excellent factual narrative,
does not establish that this "backlash against civil rights" 260
in the wake of the economic destabilization wrought by the
crumbling of the promise of the New Deal Constitution
constitutionalized neoliberalism. As Harris notes,
"Democrats as well as Republicans have pursued many of
253. See generally id. arts. 22-27.
254. See generally infra Part IV.A.
255. See generally supra note 226.
256. Id. at 1555.
257. See supra Part II.B. See generally GEORGE LAKOFF, DON'T THINK OF AN
ELEPHANT!: KNOW YOUR VALUES AND FRAME THE DEBATE (2004).
258. Harris, supra note 226, at 1555.
259. Id.
260. Id.
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these policies, particularly in the economic realm."261 This
fact is underscored by the final rejection of full employment
as a policy objective by Federal Reserve Chairman Paul
Volcker, an appointee of Democratic President Jimmy Carter,
and the "candidate of Wall Street,"262 who raised nominal
interest rates to twenty percent in 1981 in order to usher in a
new period of "flexibility" in the American labor market.263
Given the bipartisan nature of neoliberal policies and the
limitations of the two-party political system, it is hardly fair
to describe the election of one neoliberal candidate over
another as a deliberative event. Applying Ackerman's test for
a constitutional moment, the neoliberals did not gain "higher
lawmaking authority": there was no attempt by a political
movement for neoliberal reforms to "convince an
extraordinary number of [their] fellow citizens to take its
proposed initiative with a seriousness that they do not
normally accord to politics," opponents did not have "a fair
opportunity to organize their own forces," and the lack of
deliberative process from a political system at least partially
unified in its support of neoliberal reforms precluded the use
of "the deliberative fora provided by the dualist constitutional
order for this purpose."264 Consequently, neoliberalism does
not have a claim to constitutionality because there was never
a "constitutional moment" that enacted the curtailment of the
New Deal Constitution's guarantees of the economic and
social rights embodied in the Second Bill of Rights and
contemplated by the international political economy of
embedded liberalism.
For advocates of neoliberalism, it is assumed that the
"churn" of "creative destruction" will better serve the ends of
economic and social justice in the long run, even if massive
social dislocations occur in the short and medium runs (and
perhaps also the long run if this theory is incorrect).265 The
261. Id.
262. See WILLIAM GREIDER, SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE: How THE FEDERAL
RESERVE RUNS THE COUNTRY 47 (1989).
263. See HARVEY, supra note 138, at 23-26 (noting that the "Volcker shock"
caused a deep recession that destroyed many small business (which facilitated
monopolization), caused unemployment to reach ten percent, and contributed
greatly to the breaking of the power of organized labor).
264. Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, supra note 25, at
461.
265. See, e.g., W. Michael Cox & Richard Alm, The Churn: The Paradox of
[V01:49770
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empirical evidence for this claim is weak, as evidenced by
neoliberalism's track record of declining wages, increasing
inequality, periodic economic crises, and weaker overall
macroeconomic performance.266 Even if it is taken to be true,
however, that neoliberalism causes the tide of prosperity to
rise more quickly and, in the long run, to "lift all boats," it
may still be constitutionally problematic.26 7  The political
economy that flowed from the New Deal's Constitution sought
to promote domestic stability and full employment, not rapid
dislocations and turnover in the labor market.268
Furthermore, as Keynes famously quipped, "In the long run
we are all dead."2 69 Therefore, as Part IV.A will discuss in
more detail, even if the strongest arguments advanced by
proponents of neoliberalism are taken at face value,
neoliberalism is still constitutionally problematic because it
undermines the "fusion of power and legitimate social
purpose" at the heart of the New Deal Constitution and its
international face, the international political economy of
embedded liberalism.
IV. RESOLVING THE TRIBE-ACKERMAN/GOLOVE IMPASS:
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY, THE TREATY CLAUSE,
AND CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES
A. Fundamental Economic and Social Rights and the Two
Variants of Postwar Liberalism
By situating constitutional political economy within the
context of the postwar history of the international political
economy-and keeping in mind that no intervening
constitutional moment has surpassed the New Deal's
constitutional moment-it is possible to inquire into what the
Constitution has to say about the international political
economy of neoliberal globalization. Following Black, the
Progress, in FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT 4-9
(1992).
266. See HARVEY, supra note 138, at 154, 159; REICH, supra note 37, at 3-4,
103 fig. 3.2, 107 fig. 3.4.
267. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TRACT ON MONETARY REFORM 65 (1924).
268. See supra Part II.A (describing the aims of embedded liberalism); Part
III.A (describing aims of constitutional political economy after the New Deal's
constitutional revolution).
269. Keynes, supra note 267, at 88.
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"new rights" Forbath describes as being at the heart of the
New Deal's constitutional revolution can helpfully be recast
as what are called "economic and social rights" in traditional
human rights discourse. Adoption of the discourse about
economic and social rights is consistent with the history of
international governance: Roosevelt gave his Second Bill of
Rights speech in 1944, at precisely the moment Ackerman
and Golove identify as the key moment for constitutionalizing
the congressional-executive agreement procedure. 2 0  Just
four years later came the UDHR, approved as a treaty by the
Senate as part of the U.N. Charter and enumerating
numerous economic and social rights. Importantly, while the
social citizenship tradition may have inspired Roosevelt, he
chose to talk explicitly in terms of rights.
The framework of "economic and social rights" also serves
to segregate the basket of rights identified by Roosevelt at the
dawn of embedded liberalism from more expansive
conceptions that have emerged as "cultural rights" have been
added to the basket of rights serving as the "other" of
"political and civil rights. '27' While some may regret
Roosevelt's limited conception of economic and social rights,
at this particular point in history tens of millions of
Americans do not enjoy the rights set forth in Roosevelt's
Second Bill of Rights. And those who find Roosevelt's Second
Bill of Rights hopelessly limited because it is bounded by the
framework of "structural liberalism "272 are free to formulate a
Third Bill of Rights 2 3 and work to introduce it into
constitutional culture and dialogue.274
270. See supra Part I.C.
271. See, e.g., DAVID HARVEY, SPACES OF HOPE (2000) (putting forward such
an expansive framework); see also Stand Up for Your Rights, THE ECONOMIST,
Mar. 22, 2007, at 12 (voicing the traditional orthodox liberal view that only
political and civil rights are truly human rights).
272. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 226, at 1542.
273. See, e.g., HARVEY, supra note 271, at 248-52.
274. See Amy Kapczynski, The Emerging Access to Knowledge Mobilization
and the New Politics of Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804, 859-75 (2008)
(describing law's "gravitational" force at work at both the domestic and the
international levels in the transformation of the discourse about intellectual
property rights, a key aspect of many contemporary free trade agreements, by
social movements-and the transformation of social movements by legal frames
of intellectual property rights). See generally Reva B. Siegel, The Brennan
Center Jorde Symposium on Constitutional Law: Constitutional Culture, Social
Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA,
94 CAL. L. REV. 1323 (2006).
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Even from the arguably limited perspective of the rights
enumerated in Roosevelt's Second Bill of Rights,
neoliberalism presents an institutional framework that is
hostile to the protection and enforcement of economic and
social rights.2 7 Neoliberalism's shift to a competition state in
the areas of monetary and trade policy constricts the state's
capacity to act domestically to protect and enforce economic
and social rights. As Dani Rodrik explains, "[g]overnments
today actively compete with each other by pursuing policies
that they believe will earn them market confidence and
attract capital inflows: tight money, small governments, low
taxes, flexible labor legislation, deregulation, privatization,
and openness all around."2 76 Thomas Friedman invokes the
metaphor of a "golden straightjacket," the donning of which
has the following result: "your economy grows and your
politics shrinks."277 Or, in Rodrik's words, "[tihe price of
maintaining national jurisdictional sovereignty while
markets become international is that politics have to be
exercised over a much narrower domain."2 7  Within the
lexicon of modem economics, "political" aims include
protecting and enforcing economic and social rights.279
Instead of Roosevelt's "freedom from want," the animating
concern of neoliberalism is the freedom of the investor (or, to
use Keynes's preferred term, the "rentier").8 °
275. What Lisa Duggan calls neoliberalism's general tendency for "upward
redistribution" of wealth has both domestic and international elements. LISA
DUGGAN, THE TWILIGHT OF EQUALITY? NEOLIBERALISM, CULTURAL POLITICS,
AND THE ATTACK ON DEMOCRACY x (2003). For present purposes, however, the
undermining of the potential for domestic intervention to protect and enforce
economic and social rights by the international political economy of
neoliberalism shall be the focus.
276. Rodrik, supra note 159, at 182.
277. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 87.
278. Rodrik, supra note 159, at 182.
279. In describing this phenomenon, Harris references James Ferguson's
work, which describes neoclassical economics's discourse about economic
development as an "anti-politics machine" which restricts the legitimate scope
of discussion about economic policy and castigates social protection into the
realm of "politics" exercised by "special interests." Harris, supra note 226, at
1562 (citing JAMES FERGUSON, THE ANTI-POLITICS MACHINE: "DEVELOPMENT,"
DEPOLITICIZATION, AND BUREAUCRATIC POWER IN LESOTHO (1994)).
280. See Matias Vernengo, Bretton Woods, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO
POST-KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS 30, 31 (J.E. King, ed., 2003) (noting Keynes's
"main objective" at Bretton Woods "was always the management of exchanges to
achieve domestic policy goals," including "the so-called 'euthanasia of the
rentier'").
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This straight-jacketing of the state operates through both
the deregulated international financial system and the
neoliberal system of free trade. In the area of international
monetary policy, neoliberalism has reworked the "trilemma"
that was resolved under embedded liberalism through the
choices of fixed and stable exchange rates and domestic
autonomy in monetary policy (to allow space for domestic
social protection) over capital mobility. Under neoliberalism,
the "trilemma" is resolved in favor of floating exchange rates
and international capital mobility, thus sacrificing autonomy
in domestic social policy.28 1  Through unregulated
international financial flows, Friedman's "electronic herd" of
international investors disciplines sovereign governments
that would otherwise be able to engage in domestic
intervention.
Against this backdrop, in the area of trade policy, the
drive for so-called "free trade," which under neoliberalism
focuses on zero-tariffs and elimination of so-called "non-tariff
barriers to trade," instead of nondiscrimination, undermines
the conditions that encourage the private sector to pay living
wages by creating a "race to the bottom" to be won by the
country with the lowest wages, environmental standards, and
other regulations. The result is that it is less likely
employers will provide sufficient remuneration to allow
realization of key economic and social rights such as housing,
healthcare, and adequate education through market
purchases, even for those fortunate enough to have jobs.
Contemporary free trade agreements effect an international
division of labor and an international labor market that pits
workers against each other in a global competition for
employment, creating a "race to the bottom" that globally
puts downward pressure on wages, environmental standards,
safety standards, and worker protections.8 2 Concern for such
281. Even scholars sympathetic to neoliberal's "freeing" of international
finance acknowledge the restrictions it places on the ability of domestic
governments to act, even in the world's largest economies. See Layna Mosley,
Globalisation and the State: Still Room to Move?, 10 NEW POL. ECON. 355, 358
(2005).
282. See Thomas, supra note 41, at 43-44 ("[I]n many countries, [including
many countries currently luring jobs away from the United States], comparative
advantage is constituted significantly by a cost advantage that results partially
from the relative absence of government restrictions on business, such as
minimum wage rates, maximum hour rates, workplace regulations,
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outcomes is not new; as Thomas notes, the International
Labor Organization's ("ILO's") constitution provides that "the
failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labor is
an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to
improve the conditions of their own countries."283
Underscoring the current set of priorities, the ILO's power is
limited to investigating and issuing reports, while the WTO
has the power to levy large monetary penalties and authorize
significant trade retaliation against states that it determines
to have violated its rules; regional agreements such as
NAFTA also have processes for enforcing their provisions
against governments.2 4 And, of course, this new global
constitutionalism represents a marked shift from the
embedded liberalism compromise of the initial postwar
period.
As noted in Part I, the free trade agreements that
contribute to the international framework of neoliberalism
and discipline governments that try to protect and enforce
economic and social rights typically take the form of
congressional-executive agreements instead of treaties. The
debate between Tribe, Ackerman, and Golove was so pointed
because at stake in congressional and judicial views on the
permissiveness of the congressional-executive agreement is
nothing less than the constitutionality of the participation of
the United States in a central aspect of the neoliberal
international political economy. While there are numerous
proposals for reigning in and stabilizing the international
monetary system, including a new Bretton Woods-style
agreement 25 and smaller reforms, 28 6 such as a small "Tobin
environmental regulations, and so on."). Critics of the "race to the bottom"
hypothesis concede that even in "advanced capitalist democracies" global capital
markets result "in a 'strong but narrow' financial market constraint" on
domestic policy. Mosley, supra note 281, at 358.
283. Thomas, supra note 195, at 381 (citing Constitution of the International
Labour Organisation, Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, Part XIII, § 1, 49
Stat. 2713, 2714, 225 Consol. T.S. 189, 373).
284. Id.
285. See WHAT G20 LEADERS MUST DO TO STABILSE OUR ECONOMY AND FIx
THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM (Barry Eichengreen & Richard Baldwin eds. 2008),
available at http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/2543 (collecting papers
debating proposals for major reforms to the international financial system,
including proposals for a "new Bretton Woods").
286. See KAVALII SINGH, TAMING GLOBAL FINANCIAL FLOWS: A CITIZEN'S
GUIDE (2000) 197-200 (outlining smaller reforms).
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tax" on financial transactions,8 1 such measures would require
considerable political will. Moreover, unlike in Europe where
organizations such as ATTAC 8 have brought issues relating
to the regulation of the international financial system to the
fore, the public debate in the United States is much less
developed. Consequently, this article will refrain from
moving into this territory and leave aside the project of
finding remedies for the actions and inactions that have
created the present deregulated international financial
system. In the parlance of positivist social science, the
unregulated international financial system shall be an
"independent variable," taken as a given so that the analysis
can focus on the "dependent variable" of the neoliberal system
of free trade.8 9
Before assessing the institutional and constitutional
capacity of the political branches and the courts to weigh in
on-and to act on-the constitutionality or
unconstitutionality of the congressional-executive agreements
making up the international framework of free trade, a few
initial observations are in order regarding what trade
agreements that leave room for domestic protection and
enforcement of economic and social rights might look like
after more than three decades of neoliberalism. Scholars and
other advocates of alternatives to neoliberal free trade
agreements have put forward "deglobalization" and "linkage"
as two possible alternatives to NAFTA-style free trade deals.
The deglobalization approach would seek to decrease the
degree to which the United States' domestic economy is
287. Id.; see also DEAN BAKER, THE BENEFITS OF A FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS
TAX, CENTER FOR ECONOMIC AND POLICY RESEARCH, Dec. 2008, available at
http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/financial-transactions-tax-2008-
12.pdf.
288. "ATTAC," the Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for
the Aid of Citizens, formed in response to a call for regulation of international
finance in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 by Ignacio Ramonet in
Le Monde Diplomatique, the French international affairs monthly. See Ignacio
Ramonet, Leader: Disarming the Markets, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, ENGLISH
EDITION, Dec. 1997, at 1, available at http://mondediplo.com/1997/12/leader. In
recent years, ATTAC has spread to other countries. See ATTAC: The World is
Not for Sale, Qu'est-ce que ATTAC?, http://www.attac.org (last visited Dec. 29,
2008) (providing links to websites for ATTAC organizations in sixteen
countries).
289. See MARK A. NEUFELD, THE RESTRUCTURING OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS THEORY 5-8 (1995) (describing and critiquing positivist social
science's narrow focus on "problem solving").
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dependent on international trade.29 ° In the spirit of the ILO's
Constitution, linkage would require trade agreements to
include certain basic labor and environmental standards to
prevent the now-familiar "race to the bottom" dynamic from
developing.29' These alternatives will be further developed in
the next section.
B. The Political Branches as Constitutional Political
Economists
Forbath and others argue that those interested in a
return from exile for the New Deal Constitution should focus
their energies on Congress. 292  Unsurprisingly, Forbath's
argument is largely based in history: the "great reform
movements" of the New Deal Era "sought to replace the
[Supreme] Court with elected lawmakers in the role of the
nation's 'authoritative' constitutional political economist."293
Because Congress is the most representative branch, and
much more capable of quickly adapting to popular concerns
than the courts, a congressional focus is a logical approach, at
least in the context of making space for domestic protection
and enforcement of economic and social rights by reorienting
the architecture of the international political economy. Were
members of Congress, and senators in particular, to
acknowledge their obligation to promote an international
political economy conducive to economic and social rights in
the wake of the New Deal's constitutional revolution, the
courts' invocation of the political question doctrine as a
barrier to challenges against neoliberal congressional-
executive agreements would become irrelevant because there
would be nothing to challenge in the courts. 294 Congress could
290. See generally WALDEN BELLO, DEGLOBALIZATION: IDEAS FOR A NEW
GLOBAL ECONOMY (Zed Books 2004) (2002).
291. A number of international trade scholars have commented on linkage in
recent years. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Rethinking International Trade, 19 U.
PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 347, 347 (1998); Andrew T. Guzman, Trade, Labor,
Legitimacy, 91 CAL. L. REV. 885, 895 (2003); Robert Howse, From Politics to
Technocracy-and Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading Regime, 96
AM. J. INT'L L. 94 (2002); Thomas, supra note 195, at 348; Michael J. Trebilcock
& Robert Howse, Trade Policy & Labor Standards, 14 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
261, 261 (2005); see also discussion infra Part IV.B.
292. See, e.g., Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, supra note 26;
Liu, supra note 15.
293. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, supra note 26, at 4-5.
294. Indeed, Larry Sager has explained the tendency of courts to
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demand that the executive branch present it with neoliberal
international agreements only in the treaty form while
permitting international economic agreements designed to
facilitate a reasonable scope for domestic social protection to
take the form of congressional-executive agreements.295
Even the strongest advocates of interchangeability, such
as Hathaway, concede that certain areas require treaties,
such as cessation of territory to a foreign sovereign,
extradition of a citizen to a foreign country, and invalidating
disabilities imposed on aliens by state law.296 In these areas,
"[t]he Court frequently grant[s] greater scope to treaties than
to ordinary legislation," allowing the federal government to
use treaties to take actions it would not otherwise be
permitted to take.297 Hathaway points to the conclusion of
Thomas Franck and Michael Glennon that "the President and
the Senate together may achieve via the treaty power what
Congress and the President cannot do under Article I, section
8 of the Constitution. ' 29' Because Congress and the President
have an obligation to protect and enforce economic and social
rights in the wake of the New Deal's constitutional
revolution, to the extent that evasion of this obligation is ever
permissible, such as in the case of a neoliberal international
"underenforce" certain "constitutional norms" as a statement about the
limitation of the capacity of the courts and not a confirmation that a right does
not exist. See Sager, supra note 34, at 1220. Such an explanation may not be
necessary, however. See infra Part IV.C.
295. Under this view, the courts would need only to intervene where the
political branches fail in their obligation to protect and enforce citizens'
fundamental economic and social rights. See generally infra Part IV.C.
296. See Hathaway, supra note 40, at 1345-48. Since the New Deal's
constitutional revolution, the federal government has also been able to address
state-imposed disabilities on the rights of aliens under the Commerce Clause,
rendering treaties unnecessary. Id. at 1348.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 1341 (quoting THOMAS FRANCK & MICHAEL GLENNON, FOREIGN
RELATIONS AND NATIONAL SECURITY LAW (2d ed. 1993)). As Hathaway notes,
the approach of Franck and Glennon is often traced back to Missouri v. Holland,
252 U.S. 416 (1920). Id. The interpretation of Holland is not without
considerable controversy. Compare LOUIS HENKEN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 193 (2d ed. 1996) (arguing that after the New
Deal's constitutional revolution "there were virtually no matters of any
exigency-including human rights legislation-with which Congress could not
deal even in the absence of treaty"), and David Golove, Treaty-Making and the
Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty
Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1087-88 (2000) (arguing that the Treaty Clause
is 'properly conceived as an independent grant of power 'delegated' to the
national government").
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trade agreement, it should require a treaty instead of a mere
congressional-executive agreement.
Such a departure on the part of Congress from current
practice-and the near-consensus among scholars and
practitioners of foreign relations law-would likely require
considerable encouragement on the part of the general
citizenry. Consequently, social movements interested in
social and economic rights might consider framing their
struggles as struggles for the constitutional rights contained
in Roosevelt's Second Bill of Rights. As William Eskridge
notes, there is a "grand channeling function of constitutional
law . . . [as] constitutional doctrine not only channels the
energies of these social movements and countermovements,
but also channels their rhetoric and perhaps even their
ideologies into the furrows plowed by judges and law
professors."299
Reva Siegel further argues that if social movements
consent to expressing their claims as public values and draw
on the Constitution, they gain the benefits that accrue from
arguing on the terrain of "constitutional culture. 3 °0
American constitutional culture, according to Siegel, allows
social movements a path to intervening in and even replacing
reigning "authoritative accounts" of constitutional meaning:
"[wlhen dissent from authoritative accounts of constitutional
meaning is expressed under the constraints of the consent
and public value conditions, it creates a stock of new
constitutional understandings for the community to adopt."30 '
Presumably, Congress could adopt a new understanding
about limitations on the Treaty Clause either because
senators and congressmen are members of the community
and come to value economic and social rights themselves or
because the community pressures them to do so.
In his discussion of the constitutional guarantee of equal
educational opportunity arising from the Fourteenth
Amendment's national citizenship provision, Goodwin Liu has
provided a framework to aid legislators in thinking about
their obligation to make sense of and enforce the Constitution
in the context of a fundamental right to equal education. Liu
299. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements
and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419, 480 (2001) (emphasis omitted).
300. Siegel, supra note 274, at 1350-52.
301. Id. at 1357.
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advocates a "stepwise inquiry" for legislators:
First, what does equal citizenship mean in contemporary
American society? What are its political, civil, social, and
economic attributes? Second, what are the educational
prerequisites for achieving those attributes? What
constitutes an adequate education for equal citizenship in
the national community? Third, to what extent are states
currently willing and able to provide an adequate
education? Where and how do they fall short? Finally,
what federal measures are needed to ensure that all
children have adequate educational opportunity for equal
citizenship? What policies best accord equal respect to
every child, consistent with the guarantee of full and
equal national citizenship?302
Such an exercise in "legislative rationality" would entail "a
deliberative inquiry (through the usual devices of hearings,
reports, and public debate) into the meaning of national
citizenship and its educational prerequisites, and it must take
steps reasonably calculated to ameliorate conditions that
deny children adequate opportunity to achieve those
prerequisites."3 °3 This approach is generally applicable to
fundamental economic and social rights under the
Constitution beyond the right to education and could inform
deliberations regarding international trade agreements.
Recent years have seen attempts by a conservative
Supreme Court to curtail the power of Congress to address
issues such as economic and social rights, but these new
obstacles are not insurmountable. Most significantly, during
the 1990s, the Rehnquist Court raised the alarm of many by
embarking on a project of curtailing even Congress's ability to
recognize and to enforce fundamental rights.3 04 For example,
in City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court held that Congress's
power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment is
not "plenary but remedial," limiting Congress's power under
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
enforcement of rights already recognized by the Court
because otherwise, "[s]hifting legislative majorities could
302. Liu, supra note 15, at 400.
303. Id.
304. See Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term: Foreword: We the
Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 15-16 ("To nudge popular institutions out of the life
of the Constitution is to impoverish both the Constitution and the republican
system it is meant to establish.").
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change the Constitution and effectively circumvent the
difficult and detailed amendment process in Article V."3"5
Moreover, while typical post-New Deal cases elaborating
on the range of conduct that could be regulated by the federal
government under the Commerce Clause had found its scope
to be exceedingly broad,"6 the Rehnquist Court, in United
States v. Lopez, found it does not reach far enough to allow
the federal government to ban the possession of a handgun on
the grounds of a school without "a substantial relation to
interstate commerce."30 7  Similarly, in United States v.
Morrison, the Court found that the provision of the Violence
Against Women Act30 providing a private cause of action for
victims of gender-motivated violence also exceeded Congress's
authority.30 9 Both City of Boerne and Morrison cited The Civil
Rights Cases of 1883, 1°0 which held Congress cannot regulate
private conduct under the Fourteenth Amendment, in
striking down the Civil Rights Act of 1875.311 Reliance by the
Court on The Civil Rights Cases was particularly surprising
more than three decades after the passage of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964312 (although the 1964 Civil Rights Act was based
on the Commerce Clause and not Section Five) and given that
the Court had seemingly overturned The Civil Rights Cases
by holding that the Thirteenth Amendment could reach
305. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 522, 529 (1997).
306. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938)
("[Tihe existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed,
for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be
pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of facts made known or
generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it
rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and expertise of the
legislators."); see also Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964) (holding
Congress had a rational basis for finding that the actions of Ollie's Barbeque, a
family-owned restaurant in Alabama, implicated the interstate Commerce
Clause when it bought half of its meat from a supplier who had in turn procured
the meat from outside the state).
307. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995) superseded by statute,
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
308. Violence Against Women Act, § 40302, 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (2006),
invalidated by United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
309. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 599 (2000).
310. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24-26 (1883); see also Francisco M.
Ugarte, Reconstruction Redux: Rehnquist, Morrison, and The Civil Rights
Cases, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 481, 481-83 (2006).
311. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 24-26.
312. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006).
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private conduct to attack "badges and incidents of slavery. 3 13
This "new federalism" jurisprudence is not without
significant contradictions, however. For example, while the
Lopez case found that Congress acting under the Commerce
Clause cannot ban the simple possession of guns in schools,
the Supreme Court has not overturned its 1977 decision in
Scarborough v. United States, which held Congress could
prohibit felons from possessing a gun so long as it had moved
in interstate commerce,314 despite concerns expressed by
lower courts after Lopez.315 Moreover, the decision in Nevada
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs upheld Congress's
power to abrogate the immunity of states in allowing private
suits under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993,316
suggesting that, going forward, much Section Five legislation
may not be doomed under the Rehnquist Court's approach. 17
Hathaway convincingly argues that the Rehnquist Court's
"new federalism" does not reach as far as scholars such as Yoo
318urge. Regardless of their inconsistencies, to date these
decisions have been used to strike down numerous statutes
and represent a real, if receding, concern for members of
Congress interested in passing legislation aimed at
recognizing and realizing economic and social rights. 19
History also instructs that even the worst precedents
need not last forever. In the end, the precedents of the
Lochner era were overturned to make way for the New Deal.
Moreover, in Katzenbach v. Morgan, the Court upheld the
provision of the Voting Rights Act banning literacy tests
313. See Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968) (citing The Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. at 20) (emphasis omitted).
314. Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 575-77 (1977).
315. See, e.g., United States v. Patton, 451 F.3d 615, 635 (10th Cir. 2006).
316. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 737 (2003).
317. See generally Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative
Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the
Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943 (2003) (suggesting that
Section Five legislation should be upheld where it does not conflict with another
part of the Constitution).
318. Hathaway, supra note 40, at 1342-43 ("Regardless of its accuracy at the
time he wrote, Yoo's position has become less tenable in the years since ... [and
t]he pendulum seems to have swung back once again toward a more expansive
interpretation of the Commerce Clause power by the Supreme Court.").
319. Dawn E. Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist Court on
Congressional Power: Presidential Influences on Constitutional Change, 78 IND.
L.J. 363, 365 (2003).
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under Section Five' 2° even though it had held just a few years
earlier that such tests did not violate the Constitution. 321
Importantly, the Court noted that Congress has the power to
broaden, but not to narrow, the scope of the rights protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment.22 While Sunstein's mono-
causal argument that the four appointments by President
Nixon are the only reason that the rights found in the Second
Bill of Rights have not already been constitutionalized by the
Supreme Court 323 may be overly simplistic, especially because
it does not take into account the bipartisan consensus on
neoliberalism that emerged in the 1970s, it does underscore
the fact that new appointments to the Court can quickly shift
outcomes.3 24 Given that the high-water mark of the stripping
of congressional jurisdiction under this "new federalism"
approach may have already passed, members of Congress
would do well to focus more on their obligations under the
Constitution than attempts by the courts to strip
congressional jurisdiction.
While members of Congress who wish to take seriously
their obligations under the Treaty Clause may complain it is
difficult to determine when a congressional-executive
agreement adheres to the principle of "embedded liberalism"
and when it is merely another "neoliberal" agreement, well-
developed proposals for linkage or deglobalization can provide
some guidance. Rodrik introduces an "augmented trilemma"
(distinct from the aforementioned "trilemma" of international
monetary policy) to conceptualize the political choices
320. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 658 (1966).
321. Lassiter v. Northampton Election Board, 360 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1959).
322. See Stephen L. Carter, The Morgan "Power" and the Forced
Reconsideration of Constitutional Decisions, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 819, 820 (1986)
(noting that in Morgan, "the majority cautioned, however, that the Congress has
the power only to broaden the scope of fourteenth amendment rights, not to
narrow it").
323. SUNSTEIN, supra note 28, at 153-54.
324. See Robert A. Dahl, Honorary Reprint: Decision-Making in a Democracy:
The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957),
reprinted in 50 EMORY L.J. 563, 570-71 (2001) ("The policy views dominant on
the Court are never for long out of line with the policy views dominant among
the lawmaking majorities ... it would be most unrealistic to suppose that the
Court would, for more than a few years at most, stand against any major
alternatives sought by a lawmaking majority."); see also Steven G. Calabresi &
John 0. McGinnis, The Case for the Candidate: McCain and the Supreme Court,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2008, at A14 (noting six of nine current Supreme Court
Justices are over seventy).
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available in the context of a globalizing world economy. Like
the "trilemma" of international monetary policy, Rodrik's
augmented "trilemma" also only permits the choice of two of
three of its components: integrated national economies,
robust nation-states, and "mass politics."32 Neoliberalism's
"golden straightjacket" represents the choice of integrated
national economies and robust nation-states over mass
politics. 26 Bretton Woods's embedded liberalism compromise,
on the other hand, represented a choice of the nation-state
and mass politics to the exclusion of international economic
integration. 27  Thus, members of Congress should feel
confident in voting for congressional-executive agreements
that seek to delink the domestic economy from the
international economy through deglobalization. This policy
choice, however, may be undesirable or untenable and the
President may not present any such agreements in the near
future. Rodrik's framework provides another option,
however. The choice of mass politics and international
economic integration yields what he calls "global federalism,"
under which "politics need not, and would not, shrink: it
would relocate to the global level."328 Thus, Rodrik sees an
expansion of the scope of the international branch through
linkage, which will bring with it serious questions about
democratic accountability in global institutions.
Linkage could be endorsed by adoption of a simple rule
that trade agreements with robust labor and environmental
protections may use the congressional-executive agreement
procedure while those that do not contain such protections
must pass through the Treaty Clause's more stringent
requirements. Such linkage is not unprecedented; agreeing to
the WTO's intellectual property agreement-which, as
Thomas shows, is far more tangential to the core issues of
international trade than labor rights and environmental
protection-is required for entry into the WTO.3 2 9
325. Rodrik, supra note 159, at 181 fig.2.
326. Id. at 182-83.
327. Id. at 183.
328. Id.
329. Thomas, supra note 195, at 391-93 (arguing the WTO's logic in
including the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement
precludes the use of a "trade versus nontrade distinction" to exclude labor or
environmental standards from consideration and incorporation into the WTO
agreement).
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Such linkage does not resolve and may even intensify the
sovereignty concerns about delegation to international bodies
such as the WTO, however.33 ° As Thomas argues, giving
sweeping authority to international trade rules bodies
constituted under agreements such as WTO and NAFTA
effect a "double delegation": Congress first grants the
President "fast-track" or "trade promotion authority" by
restricting its ability to amend agreements negotiated by the
Executive, and second, the agreements themselves delegate
to, for example, the WTO or NAFTA the prerogative to
enforce rules governing the economy. Thomas's argument
applies equally to multilateral agreements and bi-lateral or
regional trade agreements.
While many on both the right and the left criticize this
abrogation of sovereignty, this criticism may be inapposite. If
it is accepted that the nationalization of the economy
resulting from the New Deal's constitutional revolution
established that the prerogative of the national government
to protect and enforce rights trumped the sovereignty
concerns of the states, then it could also be that the
prerogative of international institutions to do the same
similarly trumps national sovereignty. From this perspective,
the principal problem of the new international organizations
would be that they are protecting and enforcing the wrong set
of rights by promoting the libertarian economic rights of
investors over economic and social human rights.3 31 As
Thomas argues, "the solution to the dilemma of governance is
a political one. . . . The current international regulatory
structure, which comparatively evades public input, should be
replaced with genuine efforts to generate and sustain broad
dialogue as to how the international branch should look." 332
Genuine congressional efforts would certainly be appropriate,
as would more care by the President, often acting through the
Office of the United States Trade Representative, in
negotiating trade agreements in the first instance. Because
the neoliberal international branch implicates fundamental
330. See Neil S. Siegel, International Delegations and the Values of
Federalism, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 93, 101 (2008), available at
http://www.law.duke.edu/shell/cite.pl?71+Law+&+Contemp.+Probs.+93+(winter
+2008).
331. See id. at 94-96.
332. Thomas, supra note 195, at 6-7.
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economic and social rights, however, the courts may also have
a role to play.
C. The Courts as Constitutional Political Economists
The role of the political branches in policing their own
procedures for negotiating and approving international
agreements is fairly straightforward. If international
economic agreements affect fundamental economic and social
rights and the political branches do not fulfill their
constitutional mandate to protect these rights, however, the
courts also have a role. Forbath rightly takes Ackerman to
task for his failure to explore fully the implications of the
New Deal's constitutional revolution. It is also important to
consider the role that the courts have come to play since the
New Deal in recognizing, protecting, and enforcing
fundamental rights.333  If the Supreme Court were to
recognize economic and social rights as fundamental rights
protected by the Constitution, it would require a major
reversal of the direction of the Supreme Court's fundamental
rights jurisprudence of the past several decades. As Sunstein
argues, however, the outcome of the 1968 election arguably by
itself brought to a halt the trend in the Court's decisions that
many thought would lead to recognition as fundamental the
full spectrum of economic and social rights enumerated by
Roosevelt in his Second Bill of Rights. 4 Were the judiciary
to acknowledge its obligation to protect and enforce economic
and social rights, international trade agreements passed as
congressional-executive agreements would be a deserving
target for judicial scrutiny.
Before the constitutional roadblock in the area of
economic and social rights was erected by Nixon's
appointments, the Warren Court in fact seemed to have been
venturing further and further down a progressive path of
judicial recognition of human rights as fundamental rights.
For example, in Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court found the
right to use contraceptives in a general right to privacy found
333. See generally William E. Forbath, Social Rights, Courts, and
Constitutional Democracy: Welfare Rights and Poverty in the U.S., 12
Democratization 5 (2005) [hereinafter Forbath, Social Rights] (reviewing
arguments concerning the ability of courts to enforce social rights and
concluding a judicial role is justified and practicable).
334. SUNSTEIN, supra note 28, at 153-54.
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in the "penumbra" of certain rights enumerated in the Bill of
Rights. 35 Justice Arthur Goldberg concurred in the judgment
but located the right in the Ninth Amendment.3 6 In Shapiro
v. Thompson, the Court struck down minimum time-of-
residency requirements for receipt of state welfare benefits on
the grounds that such restrictions would impinge on the
fundamental right to interstate travel.3 This progress was
brought to an abrupt halt by decisions such as San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, a 1973 decision
that, in an opinion authored by Justice Lewis Powell just two
years after he drafted his aforementioned memorandum to
the Chamber of Commerce, announced the Supreme Court
was finished expanding its fundamental rights jurisprudence
to cover additional rights.3
As Black noted, a vigorous new fundamental rights
jurisprudence would likely require a reinvestment of meaning
in the Due Process Clause; the Equal Protection Clause339;
and/or key provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, such as
Section Five and its Privileges and Immunities Clause and
National Citizenship provision. Other parts of the
Constitution, such as the Ninth Amendment or the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV, section 2340 could also be
infused with new meaning. Any shift would likely require
overruling or otherwise addressing problematic precedents
such as The Slaughter-House Cases and Rodriguez. Even if
the Supreme Court is hesitant to take seriously these
arguments, they could be taken up by the President,
Congress, social movements, and private citizens until the
Court has a change of heart (or membership).
Conceiving of certain international economic agreements
as implicating fundamental economic and social rights would
preclude the traditional view of the courts that,
notwithstanding the Treaty Clause, the form of international
agreements is a "political question" to be worked out by
335. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
336. See id. at 486-87 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
337. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 654-55 (1969).
338. San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973) ("It is not
the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights.").
339. But see Michelman, supra note 225 (warning against the dangers of
locating a right to the "basic minimum" in the Equal Protection Clause).
340. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to
all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.").
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Congress and the President. As Erwin Chemerinsky notes, in
Marbury v. Madison,3 41 "Chief Justice [John] Marshall
contrasted political questions with instances where individual
rights were at stake; the latter, according to the Court, never
could be political questions. "342 Chemerinsky also notes
343
that the Court, in Baker v. Carr, stated that "it is error to
suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign
relations lies beyond judicial cognizance."344  Moreover,
overuse of the political question doctrine poses serious
problems because "there is no way that one-third of the
senators can have a voice or can enforce their position-even
if it is impeccably correct constitutional law-without judicial
review."3 45 Therefore, conceiving of economic and social rights
as fundamental rights protected by the Constitution requires
a reexamination of the traditional view expressed by the
courts that the form of international agreements is a
"nonjusticiable political question."
By recognizing economic and social rights as subject to
fundamental rights analysis and international political-
economic agreements as potentially implicating fundamental
economic and social rights, the implications for both Congress
and the courts become more apparent. Each branch has an
obligation to protect and enforce fundamental rights
protected by the Constitution. Consequently, it is arguably
beyond the scope of Congress's power ever to enact a
neoliberal international economic agreement as a
congressional-executive agreement because such agreements
systematically undermine economic and social rights and
restrict the ability of the government to protect and enforce
such rights domestically. At the very least, Congress has no
mandate in the wake of the constitutional revolution of 1937
to enact such agreements with less stringent requirements
than those demanded by the Treaty Clause.
If economic and social rights are fundamental rights, it
follows that use of the congressional-executive agreement
procedure for international political-economic agreements
341. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
342. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.6.1, at 144 (4th ed.
2003).
343. Id. § 2.6.4, at 156.
344. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
345. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 342, § 2.6.4, at 159.
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should be reviewable by the courts. One approach would be
for the inquiry to turn on whether the international
agreement increases, decreases, or has no effect on the
domestic government's ability to protect and enforce economic
and social rights. If the agreement decreases the ability or
scope of domestic protection and enforcement of economic and
social rights, at the very least, the Treaty Clause's
requirement that two-thirds of the Senate approve the
agreement should apply. Developing more precise criteria
regarding when an international agreement is based on the
principle of embedded liberalism and when an agreement is a
neoliberal agreement may require additional elaboration, but
the initial observations presented in the discussion of the
political branches as constitutional political economists346
should apply with equal force to the courts as constitutional
political economists.
For the purposes of this paper, an inquiry into whether
an agreement aims at deglobalization or provides for linkage
of meaningful labor and environmental protections is a first
step in the direction of a more robust symptomotology of
international agreements that protect fundamental economic
and social rights. The plaintiffs in Made in the U.S.A.
Foundation sought to void NAFTA altogether3 47 but this
remedy may be too blunt and the courts may be able to find a
more elegant remedy. As Forbath notes, reformers at the
time of the New Deal believed that, when necessary, "legal
invention [could] develop new procedures. "348 Such
constitutional innovation in the area of economic and social
rights is already underway in other countries. 49
346. See supra Part IV.B.
347. U.S.A. Found. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300, 1302 (11th Cir. 2001).
348. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, supra note 26, at 75; see
also Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term: The Forms of Justice, 93
HARv. L. REv. 1, 2, 52, 58 (1979) ("Adjudication is the social process by which
judges give meaning to our public values . . . [r]ights and remedies are but two
phases of a single social process-of trying to give meaning to our public values.
... The 1960s were an extraordinary period in the history of the judiciary in
America [when a judge found himself] ... forever straddling two worlds, ... the
world of the Constitution and the world of politics .... He derives his legitimacy
from one, but necessarily finds himself in the other."). See also Forbath, Social
Rights, supra note 333 (concluding that the social citizenship guarantee might
better be understood as a "directive principle" instead of as a formal right).
349. On the issue of the trend toward innovation in the enforcement of social
and economic rights internationally, see generally Jeanne M. Woods, Emerging
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CONCLUSION
This article reaches its conclusion, that NAFTA-style
congressional-executive agreements violate the Treaty
Clause, by finding a middle ground between the hyper-
textualism and formalism of Tribe, and Ackerman and
Golove's extreme permissiveness by looking closely at
constitutional history in the context of the history of the
international political economy since World War II. Like
Ackerman and Golove, the account of post-New Deal
constitutional political economy put forward here begins with
Ackerman's theory of constitutional amendment outside of
Article V. Following Forbath in exploring the full
implications of Ackerman's theory for economic and social
rights under the Constitution, however, allows the inquiry
into the permissiveness of the congressional-executive
agreement form for free trade agreements to turn on the
specific terms of the agreement instead of clashing grand
theories of constitutional interpretation.
As Forbath shows, while Ackerman and Golove are
persuasive in their argument that the New Deal and the
demands of the post-World War II international economic
order allowed-and, indeed, demanded-an expansion of
federal power, their analysis falls short because they fail to
acknowledge what ends this expansion of federal power was
to serve. Ensuring the rights flowing from an expanded
notion of social citizenship required, in Forbath's words, "the
recognition of new rights and new rights-bearers." Thus, the
increased constitutional latitude afforded the political
branches to engage in national economic and social regulation
by what Ackerman terms the non-Article V constitutional
amendments, or "constitutional moments," of this period was
an exercise of "higher lawmaking" to protect economic and
social rights such as those outlined by Roosevelt in his
"Second Bill of Rights" speech in 1944.
In addition to increased attention to constitutional
Paradigms of Protection for "Second Generation" Human Rights, 6 LOY. J. PUB.
INT. L. 103 (2005). See also Note, Mitra Ebadolahi, Using Structural Interdicts
and the South African Human Rights Commission to Achieve Judicial
Enforcement of Economic and Social Rights in South Africa, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1565 (2008) (discussing progress, problems, and proposals for judicial
enforcement of economic and social rights under the South African Constitution
of 1996).
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history, however, understanding the implications of the New
Deal and the end of World War II also requires increased
attention to constitutional political economy. As a historian,
Forbath provides an invaluable correction to Ackerman and
Golove's account of the critical period when the post-World
War II international political-economic order was conceived
and constructed using congressional-executive agreements.
He does not, however, focus his attention on the significance
of the architecture of the international political economy put
in place by these congressional-executive agreements and
others that followed. Consequently, Forbath is able to
explain why Ackerman's theory does not, but should,
acknowledge the exiling of the "New Deal Constitution" in
acts of domestic policy in the immediate aftermath of the New
Deal. On the other hand, Forbath has not as of yet extended
his work to examine the exiling of the international political
economy of embedded liberalism, an antecedent to any post-
World War II efforts to secure economic and social rights, by
the rise of neoliberalism three decades later. Few scholars,
Thomas being one, have heretofore applied constitutional
scrutiny to this shift away from an architecture for the
international political economy that explicitly sought to
maintain space for domestic intervention in the economy to
protect and enforce economic and social rights. This article
seeks to contribute to filling this void.
Extending fundamental rights analysis under the
Constitution to economic and social rights such as those
enumerated by Roosevelt in his Second Bill of Rights draws
into question the refusal of Congress and the courts to apply
constitutional scrutiny to the NAFTA-style congressional-
executive agreements premised on neoliberalism that
promote free trade. As stated in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, however, "[e]veryone is entitled to a social
and international order in which the rights and freedoms set
forth in this Declaration can be fully realized." Forbath's call
for Congress to return to its role as the "preeminent
constitutional political economist" is sensible, but, in light of
the increasing role of the courts in enforcing fundamental
rights since the New Deal, it also makes sense to reconsider
the courts' invocation of the political question doctrine to
sidestep questions about the appropriate form of
international trade agreements. After the New Deal's
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constitutional revolution, both the political branches and the
courts arguably have an obligation under the Treaty Clause,
read together with the Constitution's substantive rights-
granting provisions, to scrutinize international trade
agreements. Those agreements that embrace the principle of
embedded liberalism and strengthen the domestic
government's ability to protect and enforce economic and
social rights should have access to the congressional-
executive agreement procedure. At the least, neoliberal
agreements, which undermine the enforcement of such rights,
however, should have to meet the Treaty Clause's more
demanding treaty ratification procedure.
Finally, the conception of constitutional political economy
that emerges from examining political-economic governance
since the Great Depression and World War II through the
prism of the New Deal Constitution may shed light on issues
beyond the constitutionally permissible forms for
international trade agreements. Indeed, Forbath's work is
wholly domestic in its scope and an increased focus on
political economy approaches outside of the narrow tradition
of law and economics scholarship may have much to
contribute to the project of identifying and remedying
domestic governance issues that run afoul of post-New Deal
constitutional political economy as well as challenges
presented by a deregulated international financial order.
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